disposal of the qaimmaqam. This latter detachment is not quartered in the serai, but occupies a similar, smaller building of its own a short distance up the road which serves as a barracks and a garage for the vehicles. However, the actual direction of the police has its place in the serai, because the qaimmaqam is its civilian director, and his assistant, the mamur (Arabic, "official"), an officer with the rank of lieutenant has an office there. These officers suffer somewhat in prestige because their rank was lower than that of many of the army officers of the neighborhood, and the army tends to look down on the police. During the summer of 1951, the mamur's adjutant, also an officer, was extremely unpopular with the townspeople for the familiar abuse of policemen in comedy, helping himself to refreshments and other small items at the expense of the merchants. The daily employment of the police in Rowanduz itself includes watching the market by day, providing guards for government buildings, transferring prisoners, and maintaining a patrol in the streets by night.

Perhaps there are no more favored objects of investment in the Middle East, no matter how great or how small the amount involved, than precious metal or land. To all classes of society these two are tangible objects of wealth, and of incredibly greater desirability than such things as bank-notes or bonds, for governments and bankers are highly variable, but soil or gold are always of value.

is native to the town, although one is related to the chief mulla. It is interesting that a substantial number are Christians, for in contemporary Egypt it is common-

[illegible] with their Muslim instructors and fellows. Here the rules are reversed: the Christian instructor can be placed in some embarrassment by his Muslim pupils. Most rural school-teachers, such as those of Rowanduz, are young men of poorer families, graduates of the teachers' college in Baghdad, and, within the hierarchy of the Iraqi civil service, occupy a low position indeed. They are not highly paid (and can hence little afford the amusements of the others), and are to some extent looked down upon by bona fide administrators, army and police officers. Because of such disabilities, instructors have the not undeserved reputation of being an easy prey to extremist political formulae, and are subject to some official distrust and scrutiny. With meticulous content required of him in addition to his other complaints, the teacher is apt to feel his lot is extremely unhappy, if not precarious. On the other hand, the teacher, because he is often courted by the fathers of his pupils, is likely to play a much wider part in the social life of the town than, say, an army officer, and to enjoy considerable prestige among the lower classes, a role among these last which will be returned to later.

Playing a part in the social life of the town far greater in importance than any which it might normally

perform in its formal administration is the army. It would 701
be ungrateful to speculate on the character or strength of 554
strategic installations throughout the district, as these
constitute an important link in the chain of defenses which
guard the northern frontier of Iraq. It is possible, how-
ever, to make some cogent general remarks concerning the
unit which has its training headquarters near Rowandus, and
whose commandant, a colonel, has prestige and power equiva-
lent to that of the qaimmaqam. On the southeastern bank 712
of the Rowandus river, between Rowandus and Jindian, is located
the garrison, quartered in a huge rectangular barracks en-
closing an interior parade ground, constructed some years
ago by the British. This building houses barracks, stores,
offices, mess-rooms, and, with a few exceptions, every-
thing necessary to the operation of the unit. Near it other
parade and training grounds have been set up. Slightly
closer to Rowandus, below the road by the river, is a
motley aggregate of small mud-brick dwellings which are
used as married quarters for the non-commissioned officers.
Most of the officers as are accompanied by their wives
have their homes in Rowandus.

The unit includes a large number of officers and en- 701
listed men, and the ethnic origins of both groups are some- 563
what varied. The colonel was a Muslim Kurd, a major was a
Nestorian Christian, one captain was a "Sharh Arab,"[1] and

[1]"Sharh Arab" is English usage; referred to as Ba'adan, they prefer the term sharqi, "easterner," themselves.

grievances of the former and explaining and facilitating 622
the operations of the latter. He is called upon to certify certain government documents, such as an order for a young man's conscription, together with two chosen old men who act as witnesses. Ra'uf Effendi claimed to be assisted by two informal "agents" who brought him secretly the news circulating in the town, probably his own device for keeping in regular touch with popular opinion. Socially the office of mukhtar presupposes a qualification of wealth, for he [556] is expected to maintain a diwankhana (a room in his house [574] in which guests of social distinction could be appropriately received and entertained). Although Rowanduz itself is non-tribal and the people as a whole pay no allegiance to a chieftain, it will be seen in comparison with later exposition that the mukhtar, with several other wealthy men, [554] occupies a position in society analogous to that of an aristocrat. In fact, a girl, castigated by her relatives [627] in a love affair, may seek sanctuary in the house of the mukhtar, a custom which is solely reserved for chieftains in the countryside. Such a case occurred in 1949 and Ra'uf Effendi was able to smooth over the affair, arranging the girl's marriage with the youth in question.

In closing this section it remains to contrast the present administration of the district with that of the 175 634 Ottoman Empire immediately prior to the first World War. 648 In that time Rowanduz was the seat (a kaza) of a qaimmaqam under the Kirkuk sanjaq of the vilayet of Mosul. Administratively it was thought as important as Arbil and, as

little the people, aside from a personage like the mukhtar, are able to participate in their own government. Rowanduz, as the physical center of this government, exerts a powerful influence as well as a formal control not only over the townspeople but over the district as a whole. Such an administration, while in no sense new or unique, has extended the range of its activities into a great part of the people's life, and it is impossible to deny its relevance as the most powerful determinant in the change of local culture. Lastly, a new "elite" of civil officials and officers, alien to the area, make up its directing personnel and add a new element, reinforced by prestige and power, to the older form of society. 634 649 [647] [554]

and another an old electric light bulb suspended from the ceiling by a string. 265 [353]

The maintenance of a chaykhana can be a fairly lucrative business, for it plays an important part in the social life of the lower classes. In the absence of any other entertainment, there is almost always a large number of persons in the chaykhanas, merchants, workmen, soldiers and policemen off duty, and loafers. The chaykhana, however, is definitely limited to the lower orders of society. One of the higher ranking officials, for example, the qaimmaqam or the judge, would never be seen in such a place, nor would the army officers. The dividing line is to be found in the teachers, who sometimes visit in pairs or groups, but prefer the town "club" because it has none of the stigma attached to the tea-shop. The landed aristocrats, the chieftains, are not bound by the scruples of official or officer, but tend to avoid the places. The reason is clear and explicit. A man of the higher echelons of society is expected to maintain a diwankhana or guest-room in his home where he can entertain, and to be entertained in the houses of his friends, rather than purchase his refreshment in common with others. Similarly, a man of some standing in the community who spends much of his time in chaykhanas will quickly acquire the reputation of a loafer. Finally, as enlisted men from the army are to be found there on Fridays, there is talk that these places harbor homosexuals (hatiw baz, "homosexual," is a formidable term of abuse, an epithet which elicits knives.)

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[701] [578] [838]

elicits knives). No woman of any class of society is ever seen in a chaykhana. The bus from Rowanduz to Erbil makes several stops at tea-shops. The female passengers remain within or near the bus, and refreshments are brought out to them. 265 554 [562] [494]

The restaurant is to be found in a little arcade just above the central "square." In its furnishings it differs very little from a chaykhana, and its fare does not offer the customer a wide variety of choice. One can obtain kabab (finely-cut meat moulded about a skewer and grilled), stew, boiled eggs, bread, tea, and little else, and, by popular admission, the preparation often leaves much to be desired. Almost no one residing in the town patronized the place, save as a chaykhana, and its custom was solely derived from transients in the town who could find no other place to eat. 265 [262]

The butchers operate on a contractual basis. There is no refrigeration in the town, and, particularly during the summer months, meat must be consumed a short time after the animal is killed. Hence persons desiring to make a purchase must let the butcher have their order a day in advance, in order that he will be able to estimate the number of animals necessary for slaughter. The slaughtering-place is a gravel cut in a hill behind the town with a number of posts to which the animals are tied, and the slaughtering always takes place early in the morning. The meat which is not immediately sent to private customers is 253 [251]

appear frequently in the town, for they are virtually assured of a sale. Poultry are not merchandized by any specific persons, because almost every house possesses a number of chickens or ducks, and any person who does not have his own makes a purchase by sending out a call into the neighborhood. The only turkey in the town, a huge bird, was kept by a police sergeant, and people wondered for what magnificent occasion it was being reserved. The sergeant, queried on the point, was uncertain himself, stating that his wife and servant had grown rather fond of the bird because of its notoriety. Dairy products such as milk, mast, and cheese, together with eggs, fruits, and vegetables, are brought daily to the town by villagers, arriving early in the morning and selling their produce to merchants or at the doors of houses. A large proportion of this trade is handled by the women of Balikian, a nearby agricultural village on the main road, and early every morning a number of them make the journey up to Rowanduz, their wares slung over their backs in shawls. They are a feature of life in the bazar, and spend an hour or two after their business is concluded gathered about its shops, sometimes purchasing a few trinkets or the requirements of their homes. They are unveiled, like most village women of the lower class, and, interestingly, are vilified one and all by the townspeople as prostitutes. It is supposed that they sell other things in addition to mast and cheese, and the "half dinar egg" (an impossible price

443 [223] [235]

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for an egg alone) is a notorious commodity. The army officers are believed to visit their village regularly, and all of its inhabitants are held to suffer from "the Russian sickness," a souvenir of the Czarist army. The investigator's interpreter carried on some scandalous conversations with some of these girls until they were driven away by the house-owner, but whether there was serious intention or simply the earthy banter of peasant women is hard to decide. In Egypt it is possible to hear daily such exchanges between fallahin men and women without the slightest possibility of realization. Inasmuch as Balikian has its husbands and sons, it is impossible to believe that any significant proportion of its female population is so engaged, despite the verdict of the Rowanduzis and the wild boasts of the younger army officers.

If there is any occupation in the town which carries with it the double stigma of being at once menial and dirty, it is that of the roasters of meat or kababchis. The kababchi, always in some state of undress and blackened with the smoke of his fire, is hence often of a surly and resentful temperament, and a number of stories, by no means confined to the Kurds, confirm this character. The kababchi works in close liaison with the butcher, from whom he obtains his meat, and, like the butcher, works according to order. Two confine their operations to their houses, while the third maintains a smoke-blackened booth in the bazar. The meat is prepared in two ways, either finely

ever the years without reference to any plan, surrounding a sort of courtyard. In addition to a row of single rooms opening on the court, it shelters some shops and storerooms. The principal merchant who uses it as a place of business is a Nestorian who lives in Dyana and who, in addition to other enterprises, monopolizes the profitable supply of bottled beer and arrack to the civil servants and officers. He comes to Rowanduz only two or three times each week, and, during Ramadan, when drinking of alcoholic beverages is foresworn by most, keeps away entirely. The hotel itself offers the transient little more than a room and a bedstead. He is expected to furnish his own bedding, and to find nourishment as best he can. The "hotel," in brief, is little more than "a roof overhead and lesser animiculae within," in this, a modern descendant of the khan or fundug of Medieval days, so often described and so often cursed by travelers of that era.[1] Visiting government employees normally find accommodations with one of the local civil servants, army officers seek the barracks in the valley and Kurds, as well as Nestorians, who must spend a night in the town can find free lodgings and meals at the great house of Isma'il Beg. It follows that the khan is little used, and its few occupants are usually commercial travelers from Erbil or beyond, too low in social status to apply to the civil servants and too timid to avail themselves of Kurdish hospitality.

485 [444] [274] 485 574 485 554

[1] Mazaheri, 1951, pp. 193-194.

does not command a high price, but provides plenty of 305
leisure and social intercourse. The barber, as in
Europe or America, is a notorious channel of gossip, and, [521]
albeit poor, thinks of himself as a person of some im- [554]
portance in the community.

Much miscellaneous transport is required for short 492
distances by a town such as Rowanduz, for example, of build-
ing materials or firewood, and a number of men find em-
ployment as muleteers, furnishing their own beasts and
working by contract. "Muleteer" is a misnomer, inasmuch
as both mules and donkeys are in use, the latter animal
even thought preferable by reason of its cheapness and
docility. Little harness is used, and the secret of load-
ing the beasts consists in dividing the load and balancing
it across the back on the animal's flanks, tied up in
bundles, as with wood, or stitched in twin burlap sacks.
Brightly-coloured saddle-bags of heavy woven wool, not
unlike rugs in texture, may be purchased, and many
animals are caparisoned with tassels and other decorations.
The muleteer keeps his animal near or within his house at
night, and their departure from the bazar on a variety of
commissions is a feature of early morning.

For longer distances and heavier loads, particularly 494
the great quantity of materiel which comes from Erbil, the [493]
town has the use of two lorries. One belongs to a local
entrepreneur, Hasan Nopal, who is also its driver, and who
was in 1951 under contract to the government on road [499]

Isma'il Beg in a taxi, accompanied by two or three heavily-armed bodyguards. 574

A comparatively large group of men in the town are casually employed as laborers or porters. It has already been noticed that a number work for the government on road repair, and others are called for a variety of situations, for example, by a mason who found himself short of help. Some are of higher social rank than their fellows, such as Anwar Salah, the son of a "respectable" craftsman, who acted as a foreman over the roadworkers, and was probably hired not because of skill but because he commanded the respect of the workers and could thus effectively transmit the desires of the engineers. Aside from this, the occupations of laborer and porter are more or less interchangeable, and a number work in the bazar carrying goods for the merchants and craftsmen. Among the upper class families of Iraq, particularly those of Ottoman heritage, it is socially forbidden for an educated man to carry anything of weight in public. Those who violate this prohibition are held to be either mad or, more importantly, not real gentlemen. Any government official who desires anything large moved from one place to another must have recourse to a servant or porter. In addition to the professionals, adult men, the shopkeepers' youngsters have been mentioned in employment with these tasks, and any visitor of higher social standing to the bazar quickly finds himself accompanied by one or more.

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Because of the nature of this work, unemployment is 464
frequent for this group of workmen, both laborers and
porters, but they do not number more than forty or fifty
persons for the town as a whole.

An extensive group of persons, both men and women, 357
are employed in the town as servants, but it would be 464
difficult to arrive at any exact figure, inasmuch as this
group is always changing its numbers, almost from day to
day. The term "servant" itself seems to comprehend two
classifications, but they do not appear to have any pre-
cise social differentiation, and are only hazily dis-
tinguished in the popular mind. First, there are permanent [465]
servants who receive wages in addition to their keep and
who reside in the town throughout the year, either at the
houses of their employers or in dwellings of their own.
Most of these work in one way or another for the government,
a number in the government buildings, for example, the
qaimmaqam's doorman in the serai or the "janitor" in the
primary school, others for the army as orderlies and kitchen
help, and still others as household servants of government
and military personnel. The qaimmaqam's household has three
attached to it, a female cook, the widowed sister of a
merchant, and two men. The men do a little gardening,
perform errands and other menial tasks, and serve male
visitors in the diwankhana or the garden. To such persons 357
as these a little of the scornful treatment of the pro- 554
fessional servants of the cities, such as Baghdad, has been

brought in by government officials and their wives, but it is not obvious. Clapping the hands to summon a servant, rarely encountered in a typical Kurdish household, or prohibiting them the use of the toilet facilities of the master are the two most pointed examples. However, servants even in this category understand little of the servile behavior associated with those of the city. "It is comical," said an official. "My servant speaks to me like an old friend, and often tells me what to do. When I try to curse him for something, he argues with me and tells me that I am the one who is wrong. On the other hand, he never steals anything, and tells everyone in the neighborhood what a great man I am."

The service of others is by no means strange or uncommon in Kurdistan, but in the country the concept of a servant is that of a family retainer, a person of the second category and not a wage-earner or a menial, who receives food and lodging, and occasionally "gifts" of money, and who, while in no sense a party to the realities of inheritance or marriage, is to most purposes a member of the family. Indeed, the exchange of kinship terms, such as khal, "uncle," or pilk, "aunt," with such a retainer is commonplace, similar to our own "Uncle" Remus or "Aunt" Mandy prior to the Civil War. Almost all of these people come from the villages, and their residence in Rowandus is only temporary, although it may be repeated again and again. Many of the women have quarreled with their

husbands, and welcome a respite of a few weeks. To give an example, Shakir Effendi owns extensive village lands and is well known to his tenants. Throughout the year persons, for a variety of reasons, appear at his house in Rowanduz to take service for a short time and then to return to their villages. Lali Khan always has ten or fifteen such retainers, many of them women. "It would be a grave mistake to call Lali Khan's people servants," one was told, "because it would bring the whole House of Isma'il Beg after one as an insult. You see that she dresses them up in fine clothing and covers the women with gold." Of such retainers, it remains to mention those who serve as bodyguards (gholam, from Arabic, "servant," sometimes shubana). Just as barbarian Germanic chieftains in ancient times had the practice of surrounding themselves with bands of warrior "companions," the Kurdish chieftain attracts a following, varying in size with his wealth and importance, who are accorded the same treatment as retainers, save that they are armed and usually exempted from menial tasks. They are typically young men, impatient with village life and desirous of the prestige that surrounds an armed guard, and form a formidable group, those who carry out the work and sustain most of the casualties of the vendetta. There are a dozen or so resident in Rowanduz. The House of Isma'il Beg has a number, that of Sadiq Agha and his brother As'ad Agha several, and Karim Agha, son of the imprisoned Nuri Bawil Agha, only one. Except in degree of permanence, there is no particular

357 592 [593] [622] [554] [628]

line of division between these retainers and the professional servants spoken of first, and this explains why the officials and officers, to their annoyance and amusement, are treated more as the heads of Kurdish households rather than as employers. 357 592

If, of all these occupations of the townspeople, there is one which has greater importance, it is that of the merchants, for they, more than any others, in supplying the needs of the householders of both town and villages, in furnishing the necessary capital for larger transactions, in acting as the primary channels of commercial activity, make up the backbone of the town as a mercantile center. Of these, three general types have been listed, the itinerant trader (atar), the general merchant, and the wholesaler. The first group is the most numerous, and, in general, lacks the capital and resource of the second and third. The business of the atar is fairly simple. He applies to a merchant, usually a wholesaler, for a loan, and, if granted, receives it in goods or in money to be so converted. Equipped with wares, he departs from Rowandus for several weeks or a month in the villages, during which he sells his materials to the villagers. With the money thus realized, he may either return directly to Rowandus, or invest it in village produce, such as wool, skins, or poultry, which will bring further profit in the town. In any case, however, the profits of the itinerant traders are not excessive, for not only must they support themselves and their families, but assure the merchants of some return 443 [554] [426]

| | | 443 |
|---|---|---|
| tea | Turkish coffee | |
| toothbrushes | uniform caps | |
| toys | watches | |

On the other hand, the general merchant may buy up [438] a few items of village crafts to resell in his shop, and as much village produce of certain types, such as wool, skins, or flour, as he is able to market at a profit in Rowanduz or Erbil. Some general merchants, to be sure, live from the minor purchases of villagers and townspeople, but others do business in district import and export on a relatively large scale.

To this last group belong the wholesale merchants, 442 bazargan, who usually keep a general shop such as that described above, but who are also the real capitalists of the town, engaged in extensive operations of buying and selling in both Rowanduz and Erbil. They are the ones who furnish capital and supervision to the itinerant traders, and who supply other merchants and craftsmen in the town. In addition, they handle a large volume of miscellaneous commerce. "As'ad Effendi," a builder said, "when you are next in Erbil buy me a new saw and some hinges." "Hajji Ibrahim," said another, "my wife requires special cloth from Erbil for the wedding of our daughter." The wholesalers of Rowanduz are five in number, As'ad Effendi, Hajji Ibrahim, Hajji Muhammad Amin, Hajji Mustafa Shakir, and Sayyid Majjid, and it is interesting to note from the 788 title hajji or "pilgrim," not in use here as a proper [554] name, that three of the five have been able to make the

nothing that resembles a formal apprenticeship, nor does there appear to be any pressure exerted against a man who cares to attempt this or that employment. Occupations, it is true, tend to remain within families, as has been seen more particularly in the case of the masons, but it is far from an exclusive rule. There is some hierarchy in trades, and an unclearly defined distinction between callings which are menial and those which are not. A successful kababchi or meat-roaster might well become a merchant, but the merchant's son would rarely become a kababchi. There is also some exchange of persons between town and villages, those seeking their fortunes in Rowanduz and those, successful or unsuccessful, returning to the land, but migration from the town itself outside the district is very limited. This does not apply to the area as a whole, and large numbers of the Kurdish people of northern Iraq, both men and women, migrate from their villages to the cities. The Kurdish hamal or porter in Baghdad, as well as the Kurdish prostitute, are well known. The permanent population of Rowanduz, however, with its core of older families from the days before the first World War, seems extremely stable.

It remains to notice those people who constitute the wealthier class of townspeople, and who, although some are merchants, need not engage in labor unless they so choose. A large number of people possess minor amounts of capital or smaller holdings, such as Fatah-Ullah, but

army officer may wear his master's cast-off uniform 291
trousers, the servant of an official a frayed shirt or sweater bestowed on him, and so on. On the other hand, a civil official or officer, aside from a few lounging items used privately, never appears in the "national dress" of a Kurd or an Arab, even in part. The Arabic adjective baladi 186
(from balad, "town" or "municipality") is met here for the 291
first time, referring to a "true countryman" in the same 554
connotation as echt deutsch in German, but with an extremely derogatory meaning. An Iraqi who follows a career as an official or an officer has entered a higher class of society, and to misunderstand his new status by wearing, say, a skullcap, a turban, or the Arab headdress, would expose him to ridicule as a "rustic," baladi, who has no understanding of urban manners. This is particularly true [668]
of a Kurdish official, for such attire might be interpreted as symptomatic of nationalistic, and hence revolutionary, leanings. While the older aristocracy, the Arab and Kurdish chieftains wear the costumes of their people as a matter of course, there is no democracy of clothing as far as the government service and the governed are concerned.

Most of the men of the district are armed and appear 411
frequently in public carrying weapons, particularly the chieftains and their bodyguards. The simplest and most widespread is the khunjir or dagger which is a curved blade of steel, sharpened on both edges, with a raised central rib. The hilt, without the protection of a guard,

the materials. Here bright colours are worn, typically 292
deep reds and blues, and a number of chemises, skirts, and aprons make up the costume. A white blouse and a tight jacket with long sleeves are often seen. For a headdress, the headcloth is white and is coloured silks is found, as well as a cap to which a circular disk, the qurs, some five inches in diameter, of embossed gold or silver has been sewn and around which a turban of silk is affixed. This last is one of a woman's dearest possessions, and the qurs, refitted with cap and turban whenever necessary, is either bestowed on a favorite daughter or kept until death. Whether or not a woman "dresses up" each day depends very much on her own personality. In some houses of the wealthy, the mistress wears only a simple print frock and the white headcloth, while in others, sometimes of lower station, the wife is always resplendent in a multiplicity of garments and jewelry. The servants of Lali Khan, herself in perpetual mourning, are always "dressed for a wedding." In cold weather women of any class do not use a coat, but add undergarments and a shawl.

The wives of government personnel, who are for a 554
large part Arabs, have the same social origins as their 562
husbands, the educated middle and upper class families of Iraq. Some of the officials are unaccompanied by their spouses, and those of lower rank, the mudirs, the junior army officers, and the teachers, are usually unmarried. Nevertheless a number of these women are resident in the

town, and have a certain amount of influence on its social life. An interesting phenomenon is to be observed here, for the officials and officers, who are far more European in certain respects than the Kurdish populace, are more illiberal in their concept of women, particularly in a rural setting in which gossip enjoys considerable power. Masculine friends of a Kurdish home might meet its mistress socially, but in Rowandux the best friend of an official, no matter what his derivation or status, can visit a house regularly for a matter of years and never catch sight of the wife in question. Whenever these women appear on the streets they are closely veiled in black from head to toe, and are never seen uncovered by any save their husbands and other women. The young medical officer, trained in Lebanon and otherwise thoroughly cosmopolitan, was peculiarly adamant on this point. It must be noticed that under their veils these wives wear garments which are no different from those of their sisters in Europe or America. It is interesting to see one of them walking, shrouded completely in shapeless black, and in the ten or twelve inches between veil and ground to observe nylon stockings and fashionable high-heeled sandals.

Many women go barefoot in their homes, and their footwear includes European models, some simple slippers, and the kabkabs. These last are smooth wooden clogs, raised slightly at the heels, with leather straps for the toes, and, after hair-pulling, are the favored weapons in a feminine brawl. Women of the villages or poorer families

tribal group as a whole from which the chieftain is "granted" his yearly share, while in other cases they are his personal possessions, inherited through the noble family, which he can dispose of as he pleases. It appears that a stage between tribal and feudal society is represented here, a combination of both systems which may have existed in this way for centuries, and which is largely primitive in character. 423 619 622 565

The aristocratic Kurdish households are, in fact, extended patrilineal families for which the term is _familiya_, puzzling in its similarity to the Latin _familia_. The same noun is sometimes applied to houses of great wealth and numbers, but this seems to be comparatively rare. Only these households and _sayyids_, descendants of the tribe of the Prophet, keep genealogies (_sajara_, from Arabic _shajara_, "tree"). In the case of the _sayyid_ the title can be inherited on either side, but the patent of nobility is solely patrilineal. One of the tests of nobility is said to be the ability to name one's patrilineal forebears to seven generations, and no one in Rowanduz, outside of these families, is able to perform this feat. The titles of the nobility include _beg_, _agha_, and _mir_, all of Turkish derivation. In Ottoman times _pasha_ was also in use, and the grandfather of Isma'il Beg was called "Abdullah Pasha." The Arabic _shaykh_, literally, "old man," appears, as in such distinguished Kurdish figures as Shaykh Mahmud, leader of the revolts in 1922 and 1930, and Shaykh Taha, 565 596 [173] 611 565 565 554

noted for his piety, but it not only connotes chieftainship, in the sense of the Arabs, but also has a religious meaning. Certain Kurdish chieftains, shaykhs, were supposed to have an almost magical quality in their persons, and, for example, could cure ailments by the laying on of hands. In general, each son takes the title of his father, thus Rashid Agha of Jindian is the son of Muhammad 'Ali Agha, and all of his brothers have the same distinction. As far as hierarchy is concerned, beg, as in Mahmud Beg of the Baradost tribe, appears to have greater weight than agha, but there is no definite system. The investigator suspects, in view of some of the confusion in this regard, that titles are given very much as proper names at the time of birth. On the other hand, commoners never use them, even as names, and noblewomen have no such designations, although words such as amira, "princess," or khan, "chieftain," may appear in their appellations.

The chieftain, to a large extent, is the symbol of his people's honor, tribesmen or tenants, and this is a matter of supreme importance to both Arab and Kurd. Honor has a large number of aspects of which the most important are the obligation of vengeance, safeguard and sanctuary, the integrity of women, and hospitality. If a man has been murdered, it is incumbent on his relatives to avenge his death, and this is the beginning of the vendetta or blood-feud. The peaceful solution is the payment of bedalkhwin or blood-money, an amount calculated in goods or cash, but

of quarrelity. Commoners are not in a position to quarrel with a chieftain, and the problem was usually solved in this way. The youth was summoned and kissed the hand of his reluctant father-in-law, addressing him as a parent. If, however, the fugitive couple belonged to aristocratic houses, the most sanguine of vendettas could follow. 622 624 584

The integrity of its women is perhaps the primary asset of a family's honor. If a Kurd insults anything other than the women of his opponent, he is in danger of being slain himself. If, however, he seriously questions the honor of a woman, the latter must be killed by her relatives, never the accuser. The accusation is thus extremely dangerous, and, although it is sometimes heard in joking exchanges, a serious accusation cannot be taken lightly. The honor of a man depends very much on that of his female relatives, and the primary rule in this second regard is that no woman, unmarried or married, can have unseemly traffic, specifically intercourse, with any other person than her husband. If a bride cannot demonstrate her virginity, she can be returned to her relatives who are obligated to slay her, although she is not thus dead to them in every sense. Similarly, if there is an accusation of adultery, a wife can be directed to the same fate. The woman, it might be said, is always the offender. It follows that if a woman errs in this way and is detected, she must flee, either to a chieftain or 577 562 554 [684] [585] 589 562

to let Mahmud Beg know of their presence and visit his 622
[illegible], or he will think they look down on his hospital- 574
ity, or, worse, do not know him or recognize him as a
chieftain."

Save for the question of hospitality, it may be seen 423
from the section on administration that the government 648
takes a strong interest in chieftains' activities. The
state lays claim to all unregistered land, [illegible], which
includes a large amount of "tribal" and village territory,
and would prefer to collect taxes directly from the pro-
ducers, thus cutting off the most important source of
aristocratic revenue. Some of the chieftains, abreast of
the times, have attempted to have tribal lands registered
in their own names. The execution of the law belongs to 648
the government, either the civil code of the judge or the 692
tribal code of the [illegible]. Vengeance is also of the [692]
state, and homicides are to be handled by the police and
the courts, rather than the vendetta. Safeguard and
sanctuary in a well-policed district are thought to be
unnecessary. Modern Iraq is in concept democratic, and [554]
such titles as [illegible], [illegible], or [illegible], while they are widely
used, do not enjoy the sanction of law. The army and the
constabulary are thought adequate to handle military
exigencies, and the arming of a populace, particularly
parties of bodyguards, is considered superfluous, if not
dangerous. Thus the Kurdish aristocracy has lost many of 525
its important functions and perquisites. They are no longer 178
leaders in war or administrators, and much of their

townspeople themselves, or to the government personnel, 622
although most of its details are commonplace. Marriages 565
between aristocratic houses often follow these alignments, 572
although now and then a wedding is arranged which will join [582]
two houses not normally friendly toward each other. A
chieftain with a number of daughters and sufficient wealth
and prestige to attract suitors can build up quite a system
of allies, thus increasing his own power, and the same can
be done with a number of sons.

Turning to the townspeople, who in the first system 565
constitute the mass of commoners, a rather confused social
hierarchy is revealed. Several concepts are responsible
for this, the first of which is that it is considered de- [461]
grading for men of the "upper" class to work with their
hands. The group of persons who are not so tainted, in
addition to the aristocracy, officials, and officers, thus
includes among the people of the town the clerks, land-
owners, mullas or priests, and businessmen, such as the
wealthier merchants and the owners of the clayhouses and
the hotel. Such a person is termed effendi or "gentleman," [554]
and occupies the highest ranks of the commoner group. Two
examples are provided by Shakir Effendi and Ra'uf effendi,
both landowners. In addition to their properties, Shakir
Effendi is the clerk of the judge's court and Ra'uf Effendi [693]
is the mukhtar or representative of the townspeople. The
chief mulla of the town is addressed as "Mulla 'Abd-al-
Karim Effendi." Literacy, a distinctive requirement of the [212]

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series made up solely of males. To this are added noteworthy collateral ancestors and, in the one or two generations closest to the chieftain in question, all of the collaterals, including the names of wives, sisters, and the latter's husbands. The importance of such a lineage lies in the fact that it is the sole patent of nobility, itself a matter of the highest social importance, and is of considerable value in the arrangement of marriages and the knowledge of one's potential friends and enemies. It is usually associated with a certain amount of folk history, the wars, revolts, feuds, and other deeds with which its personnel were concerned. Commoners are able to reproduce to some extent the lineage of their chieftain, for, as has been noticed, the honor of their leader is also their own, and animated conversations on such topics as aristocratic marriages and lineages offer an everyday source of entertainment. Unlike the mal, the fesilîye is not associated with a single house, and its members may live in a large number of separate establishments.

It is convenient here to dismiss the question of inheritance with a cursory survey. Inheritance is not a matter over which the Kurdish populace exercises any unique control, because it was defined in the Quran and supplemented over the centuries by the jurists and doctors of Islam. A whole branch of Islamic jurisprudence is concerned with this complex question, and a number of popular expositions are available to the general reader.[1] In

[1]Geuthofer-Demombynes, 1946, pp. 143-151.

a husband to honor this second amount if the contract 583
is broken before the marriage is consummated or if the 421
woman, for some reason, abandons the house of her spouse.
In Rowanduz, in contrast to other areas, the father of
the bride is expected to double the first portion of the
dowry, the mucaadan, from his own resources, and the
money thus realized is given into the hands of the maiden.
"The money of the mucaadan is for the girl," it was
related, "and it is an evil and impious parent who with-
holds it from her. There are some bad fathers who eat up
their daughters' dowries." The dowry of a girl of the
lesser townspeople in Rowanduz is at least 20 or 30 dinars
($56.00 or $84.00) and that of daughters of the wealthier
families or the aristocrats is much greater.

It must be realized that the amount of a dowry is 583
also a sign of social status, and to this end the figures 554
written into the marriage contract often have more prestige
than reality behind them. A number of discussions of this
point have been heard in the Middle East, and one of these,
similar to those recorded in Rowanduz but perhaps more
aptly expressed, was the expostulation of an English-
speaking teacher, one Hasan al-Gasti, in Egypt. "When, as
a youth, I returned to my parents' town from the university
in Cairo," he said, "I was called upon to negotiate the
dowry of a maiden whom my younger brother wished to marry.
Her relatives, when I spoke with them, named a figure so
extravagant I could hardly credit my ears. I told them it
was improper to bargain for a girl, and that, although I

agreed with them and went beyond them in the estimation of her worth, only the sale of all my family's property could realize their demand. One of them was kind enough to take me aside and to explain that there was a substantial difference between the documentary amount, publicized to the townspeople, and that which must actually be paid." It is perhaps for this reason that the muqeddam, the amount "paid" at the time of the wedding, is a much larger proportion of the dowry than the mu'akhar, that which must be forthcoming in divorce, the former representing in part the social fiction and the latter a more realistic economic appraisal. Nevertheless, the dowry functions strongly as an argument against heedless separations, and few men, having invested a substantial part of their own or their relatives' capital in a match, will undertake divorce lightly. As recorded above, many persons use unusual monetary gains to give their wives jewelry of precious metal, a matter of pleasure for the lady and, at the same time, further insurance against divorce or financial catastrophe.

583 554 [586] [301] 593 454

To approach the Kurdish kinship system, it is necessary to deal with certain other aspects of marriage, the first of which is incest. Unlawful intercourse or marriage between certain relatives is also governed by the religious law of Islam, and one cannot with confidence adduce anything from contemporary Kurdish society which will provide a functional or final explanation of the specific determinants of these prescriptions. There is

582 834

a noun precedes its genitive and is inflected, for example, 601
xwushki mard, "sister of husband," rather than mardxwushk. 193
This last series of observations is not that of the investi- 197
gator himself, but were offered informally by E. M. McCarus, a linguist who has made the Kurdish language the subject of an extensive study.

In approaching relationships within the mal or 554 ●
"house," several things must be emphasized in order that a 577
proper perspective may be gained. The first of these is 602
the question of family honor. Personal honor, for example, in cases in which a man might acquire a reputation as a liar, a thief, a weakling, or the like, seems always to be dwarfed by the larger matter of family honor, and, as noticed in the section treating society, this is closely connected with that of the household's women. This is measured in two 562
regards, whether or not the woman has been chaqte prior to [836]
her marriage and whether or not she remains faithful to [837]
her husband after it. One of its several expressions, for
woman of the upper strata of society, the townswoman of [565]
wealthier homes and the wives of the aristocrats and [291]
officials, is the wearing of the veil. Such women are required to conceal their faces, if not their persons, from those unrelated or not intimately known to their families. The women of the lower classes are unveiled, but even then are not permitted extended traffic, such as lengthy conversations, with males unknown to their husbands. The decorum demanded of women serves to orient relationships within and without the household. Coupled with this

or guest-room, apart from all of the women of the house. 604 574

The eldest brother occupies a position over his brothers and sisters analogous to that of the father. He shares to some extent in the parental authority and is responsible for the house when the father is absent. Often he is entrusted with money from which he gives his younger brothers their rozhana, "daily allowance," a sum which increases in size with their years. The children are taught [454] to save this money in a box, and whenever the eldest brother makes a journey to Erbil or a similar place he takes their savings and purchases them something they desire. Like that of the father, his word is law and all of his directions must be carried out by those junior to him without alteration. Whenever he enters the room, the younger children are supposed to stand, although this is not invariably done. If the eldest of the children [562] is a girl, she has much the same authority as a boy, without, however, the formalities mentioned above. She is usually the chief helper of her mother in housework and the care of the younger children. In several families observed in which the eldest was a girl, the brothers disobeyed or teased her only at the risk of being punished. There seems to be little of a hierarchy among the younger brothers and sisters, and it cannot be said, as it sometimes is in America, that the youngest is the darling of the family, save in the case in which he is the first boy. 583 The boys learn very early to be jealous of their sisters' 557 honor, not only in protecting them in the usual quarrels 577

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f childhood, but in later life. If a woman is re- 593 577
urned for some reason to her parental home, it is as 554
uch a reflection on her brothers as on herself.

In all of the situations outlined thus far there 291
as been no question of the veil, except for a maternal 882
ncle and a husband of a paternal aunt who are not per- 574
itted to associate freely with all of the women of the 602
ouse unless they happen to be close friends of its master. 835
he veil enters in between cousins of marriageable age,
nd the striking difference between a married man and a
achelor is encountered for the first time. When a young
an reaches what is considered adulthood, about fifteen
r sixteen years, women of other houses begin to conceal
heir faces from him. If, for example, he visited the
ouse of his father's brother, the latter's wife might
ppear unveiled to him, but the adult, unmarried daughters
f the house would be at least shy and retiring in his
resence, usually fleeing at his approach (not, however,
osing the opportunity to observe the potential bridegroom
rom hiding). When he is married, the whole situation
hanges and he is free to mingle with them unveiled, even
lone together in a room. There are, of course, none of 605
hese restrictions among male cousins and among female
ousins. Two youths who are cousins greet each other by
haking hands or kissing each other on the cheek. It is
aid that a young man could greet the daughter of his
aternal uncle by kissing her on the arm or shoulder, but [584]

wealthy widow, never lives alone, and rarely remains unmarried for any length of time. It would be virtually impossible for her to have an unmarried man in her service in the face of popular opinion. It is much the same with a bachelor living alone, for the townspeople would never countenance his engaging a maid, even if he could find one. The same holds true of an unmarried person living with a family to which he is not related. The investigator lived for a time with the family of a merchant, superficially separated from them by a wall of blankets, and a certain segment of neighborhood opinion let it be known that this householder had sacrificed the honor of his family for the sum of the rental. The merchant informed the investigator that he was convinced that the latter, as a gentleman, had no evil intention toward his womenfolk and that the veil of blanketing was for "the neighbors" rather than any practical purpose of segregation. This, incidentally, provided him with an excuse for charging a slightly higher amount than necessary. It is also interesting that, after the rooms had been engaged, several invitations were received, accompanied by expostulations, to stay as a guest with other families, deferred until this time. Almost all of those unmarried, the teachers and lesser officials, must hire houses and male servants of their own. There are a few exceptions. The qaimmaqam, unaccompanied by his wife, lived alone, and had several persons, including a widow, in his service. The superiority of his position, coupled with the fact that he was already married,

absolved him from any gossip. If one is married and accompanied by his spouse, her vigilance is considered sufficient and servants of any condition may be added to the household. 592 554 357

Friendships contracted outside the mal, as noticed in the discussion of society, are, in adulthood, formed between persons of comparable social status. A few lasting alliances may arise in childhood or adolescence, but most appear when the persons concerned have become adults. For all classes of society, only the men are free to associate with their friends in public. "A good friend helps one in distress with money, clothing, or food. The two friends visit each other almost every day, sitting together and discussing business or politics. If one of them is a bachelor and is subsequently married, the other acts as his 'servant,' receiving guests and completing the arrangements of the wedding." Male companions of this sort visit with each other in the bazar or the mosque, and exchange calls at their houses. Within the house, a friend is entertained in the diwankhana or guest-room, apart from the women, until, perhaps, both are married and the friendship is of long duration. Only under these last conditions is a man able to associate freely with his comrade's womenfolk. An old custom is sometimes observed between youths, a formalized exchange of bread and salt, termed nimak, within the house. If two male friends have not met for a long period, they greet by kissing each 572

known by his trade, as in 'Umar Chaichi, 'Umar the Tea-shop Owner, by a nickname, as in Shakir Majjrim, Shakir the Criminal, or by his birthplace or region, as in 'Ali Farsi, 'Ali the Persian. Those who claim descent from the Tribe of the Prophet may preface their name with sayyid, "Lord," as in Sayyid Ahmad of Batas, and have the right of [292] wearing the green turban. Only the Kurdish nobility use titles such as agha or beg after their names, although the townspeople often apply these to officials and officers of the government elite. The only titles which precede the proper name seem to be Arabic, hajji, a pilgrim, mulla, a priest, sayyid, a descendant of the Hashimite Tribe, and shaykh, an aristocratic or religious chieftain. The titles which follow the proper name are Turkish, agha, beg, effendi, and pasha. These are used in combination. The chief mulla of Rowanduz is formally addressed as Mulla 'Abd al-Karim Effendi. No local pattern could be discerned to the aversion of calling a child by his proper name in public, a custom extremely widespread elsewhere in the Middle East, nor did there appear to be any marked attempt to conceal the sex of a male child, for example, dressing him as a girl, to avoid the evil eye.

When able to walk, infants usually join their brothers and sisters in the common bed and accompany them in their play. The older girls are charged with their care, and a child of the wealthy or the aristocracy is rarely left unattended. Those of the lower classes are allowed to wander about the streets of the town, sometimes to their

perd.

the son-in-law of the Prophet and his descendants. Something of the divisive aversion of the Sunnite Kurd for his eastern neighbor has already been seen, although phrased as much in ethnic as in religious terms. Of the four Medieval Sunnite schools of religious law, Hanifite, Malikite, Shafi'ite, and Hanbalite, the Kurds nominally belong to that founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 767), originally a following noted for its liberal tendencies and the admission of logic in formulating legislation, now, however, crystallized into a rite not differing too greatly from its surviving fellows. 795

Beyond this brief classification, it is of no purpose here to enter into an extended discussion of the theological content of Islam insofar as it does not pertain to daily life, for, not only are these matters exhaustively and competently treated elsewhere, they are largely of no moment to the townsman or chieftain. The investigator was often told, on inquiring into some matter of religion, that "one must ask the mulla these questions," just as many Christians refer weightier queries to their priest or minister. In noting the Shiite insistence that the successors of the Prophet be of his own blood, the sayyid ("lord") or descendant of the Tribe of Muhammad might be mentioned. Many persons in the Rowanduz district, as well as several in the town itself, lay claim to this distinction, which carries with it the prerogative of wearing a green turban and the enjoyment, if they choose to exploit it, of a reputation for sanctity. This descent 771 121 173 554 792 [292]

may be traced through either parent, and almost anyone, if genealogies were regularly kept by the commoners, could find some relative from whom the title might be claimed. The only sayyid in Rowanduz who made use of the green turban was a poor and elderly blacksmith, something of an extrovert, who also wore a beard to increase his appearance of saintliness. The chieftains, many of whom have the title, usually avoid these appearances, such as Sayyid Ahmad of Batas who dressed in the same fashion as the other aristocrats. Whether these pedigrees are genuine or bogus is impossible to say, for the Arab penetration of Kurdistan has gone on for many centuries, but one may suspect that, insofar as the title accords a little social distinction, many of these claims, at some point, are as valid as those of some pretentious Englishman who finds ancestors for himself who landed with the Conqueror or an American who discovers forebears on the Mayflower.

The religious phraseology of the townspeople is in the Arabic language. All of their prayers, pious utterances, and, indeed, their expletives are in Arabic, while everyday speech is Kurdish. Prayer will be dealt with below. The most common expletive, heard constantly in the conversation of the day, is simply Ullah, "God." It can be used in a variety of contexts, some of them pious and many quite otherwise. The tired merchant stretching himself on his cushions or bed may utter a long-drawn out Ullah, and the same is applied to a welcome glass of tea, a lovely woman, or the like. It should not be supposed, of course,

which the mu'azzin calls the townspeople to prayer. To 346
the right of the porch, on the street leading up through
the bazar, is a pump, in 1951 in disrepair, for those [312] [515]
desirous of praying in the mosque to make their ablutions.

The great mosque resembles those classical examples
to be found in the cities of the Middle East in general
aspect, and differs from them in certain ways.[1] It boasts
no minaret or tower from which the mu'azzin might give his
call, and does not have an interior courtyard containing a
tank or fountain of water for purification. More importantly, [529]
it is used by many of the townsmen as a sort of club, and [521]
one may find a number of them in the hours between prayers,
seated or lying on the carpets of the main room, discussing
purely mundane matters. In addition to the wearing of shoes, [784]
smoking and taking refreshment are forbidden within the
mosque, as are animals or immature children. Strangers may [513] [485]
sleep on its floor at night if they wish. It is commonly
held that the restriction of the mosque to religious exer-
cises, as in those of the cities, was a result of Ottoman
influence, and it is interesting to find its secular uses
preserved in Rowanduz. The other three mosques in the town
are nondescript rubble buildings with flat mud roofs. One 346
of these, the woman's mosque, is found above the bazar near 562
the civil officials' club, and is notorious in town life [521]
as a center for gossip. Men are not permitted to enter it.
Both townsmen and the chieftains make use of the mosques 554 346 771

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[1] Mazaheri, 1951, pp. 14-17.

whenever they feel inclined, but members of the government elite avoid them. The wives and daughters of wealthier households rarely visit the women's mosque, perhaps because in some matters the women are far less democratic than the men.

It is commonly said that Islam has no priesthood, but at least one author has written an entire volume to disprove this thesis.[1] The functions of the mulla in Rowandus serve to support the latter view, for they are extremely similar to those of a Christian divine. The mullas in Rowandus have no other occupation, and are supported by funds provided by the townspeople. They are responsible for the maintenance of the mosque and the administration of awqaf, bequests to the faith. They conduct the services in the mosque, and officiate at such occasions as the naming of a child, circumcision, betrothal, and death. They have certain judicial powers, as noted in connection with divorce. On the other hand, they are not formally ordained, nor are they subordinate to any higher authority, although they may, if they choose, be attentive to such figures as, say, the Shaykh of Islam in Egypt or the Mufti of Jerusalem. There were three mullas in Rowandus in 1951, of whom the unofficial leader was Mulla 'Abd al-Karim Effendi, in charge of the great mosque and the control of awqaf.

There is no standard pattern for achieving the priestly office. In Kurdish Iraq a youth who has chosen

[1] Brewer, 1946.

district have made the trip, and are entitled to call themselves hajji or "pilgrim." Three men from the town went in 1950, and the wealthy merchants, such as Hajji Ibrahim and Hajji Muhammed Amin, who have completed the task have been mentioned. The return of pilgrims is an event of great importance in Rowandus, and a crowd gathers to greet them at Kawlokan below the town. The pilgrims are escorted from the bus to their homes, accompanied by the music of drum, flute, and tambourine. Banquets are held for them, and each is expected to give a detailed account of his journey. They return with many souvenirs, such as rosaries, which are distributed to relatives and friends. A pilgrim commands a certain amount of public respect, and persons often stipulate sums in their wills for another to make the pilgrimage in their name. It is interesting that wealthy commoners can afford this undertaking, while many mullas or priests are rarely able to realize it. Chieftains or members of the government elite who are pilgrims are comparatively few in number. Hajji Muhammed 'Ali Agha of Jindian made the pilgrimage to avoid the police. Few of the aristocrats or officials in Rowandus itself could claim the distinction. The duty of jihad or Holy War only enters into everyday life as a matter of conversation, usually with reference to Israel, and that of feuding will be discussed below.

Islam also includes a large body of social legislation, and that which is pertinent to this study has already been indicated. The use of alcoholic beverages,

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Fig. 21. Sheikh Taiba's property. Topsawa.

configuration of the ground, lay on a ledge above it. The farm had direct access to the courtyard through an opening in a low wall. It comprised stables and store rooms which enclosed the small court on three sides; the fourth side being filled by a garden and a basin for ablutions. As appears from the ground plan and elevation, the entrance to the farm lay to the west of the property. Its double gate was of corrugated iron. Admission to the family house was only possible through a narrow wooden door with two steps outside and a corridor inside which led into the court-yard. In the wing of the family house a room possessing direct access to the higher-ed was occupied by the widow and her sons, and in the wing of the farm dwelt the servant girl and her children. Neither of these two rooms was connected with the family house or the farm, being completely isolated. Built together with, but not directly connected with it, was the guest wing[9]. A guest wing is typical of the finer houses in Kurdish villages and is maintained by subsidies from the whole village to the squire. It is dealt with in detail as a sociological phenomenon by Barton, Edmonds and Leach[9]. There was direct access to the guest wing from the narrow highway that passed by the property to the village of Rakawa. At right angles to the small steps up to the door of the family house some more steps led to another wooden door through which one passed into a loggia. The roof to this was supported by five columns of hacked, but variegated shaped poplar trunks with roughly-hacked wooden blocks inserted as

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[55A]
[114]

[Text Continues Top of P 32--Analyst]

4: Hanson E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11



The woman who makes the tea has nothing to do with serving it, and never moves from her position behind the samovar. Members of the family and guests also remain seated in their places. If no children are present, it is for the humblest of the adults present, irrespective of sex, to fetch the empty tea glasses and bring fresh ones. As a rule it is children's work. From the time they are able to balance across the floor with a tea glass and saucer in the one hand they take part in this ceremony.

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Cooking. In addition to the morning meal consisting of water and dry, sheets of bread folded into convenient to be used as spoons when eating the *mâst*[Pr], and, rarely, fried eggs, *kâlla*, swimming in butter, the women prepare two warm meals in the course of the day. The one is eaten a little past noon, the other at about 6 p.m. Food left over can be kept for the following meal, but remains of the evening meal are only an exception consumed the next morning. In fact remains of food are never kept for any length of time as there are no facilities for so doing and the heat in the summer is too great, about 104 F.

The basic ingredient of lunch and supper is *brinj*, rice, steamed in butter[Pr], with which is served one or two kinds of tomato thickening or sauce with vegetables or small morsels of meat. Meat is not obligatory, but when served it is mutton or fowl. The latter is dipped in boiling water to loosen the feathers and then plucked, cleaned, washed and boiled or roasted. On festive occasions it is served in large pieces, otherwise in small, with sauce. Fowl could also be grilled: split, strewn with salt and spitted on long skewers stuck down in a circle around the fire. Boiled wheat grain, crushed in a revolving grinder[Pr], is used as a substitute for rice. Rice is carefully washed and rinsed before it is poured into boiling water or melted butter.

In regard to meat dishes there is *kâbâb*—not the Turkish kind[Pr] consisting of whole pieces of meat skewered and grilled—but made of minced meat which is pressed around an iron bar like an oblong hamburger. These bars are then placed side by side on the brazier. When cooked they are pushed off the bars with a folded sheet of bread.

Tomatoes, *bâmjân*[Pr] or 'ladies' fingers, and *bâdinjân* or eggplant[Pr] plus gherkins, bright, fresh, marrows, onions, potatoes, parsley, beans and peas[Pr] are the vegetables used. Cucumber is eaten thinly-sliced in water as the morning meal and also grows as a sort of fruit, split into small beans strewn with salt.

Of fruit there are plums, apricots, figs, grapes, yellow melons and water melons. A favourite dish at Topsawa, Sulaimani and Bâkha is vine-leaves wrapped round a mixture of rice and mince, placed in a saucepan with tomatoes and onions stuffed with rice over which is poured butter and a very little water[Pr]. Meals consist of one course only followed by fruit. Rice was served on a flat dish accompanied by bowls with the meat and vegetable sauce. As a rule two such bowls with various contents were brought in on the large circular metal tray, and placed straight on the floor. As a European I was given a table, but this was an exception. In the same bowls are spoons of metal or of wood, about 0.225-0.245 m. long (E. 2366, 67, 68), for ladling sauce over the heap of rice one intends to eat. Then, with the fingers of the right hand a suitable heap of the damp rice is rolled in the palm of the same hand, and pushed into the mouth by the thumb. If larger pieces of fowl are served they are placed

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11



can be attached to what this young man said, so I prefer to stick to the facts available about his immediate family. In the humble village environment (Tegawra) I came across three examples of brides having been brought from Sulaimani as they gave prestige to the village. In the educated milieu, on the other hand, I met a strongly-expressed wish to be linked by marriage with good, prominent families. 582 583

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*Difference in the position of man and woman when contracting marriage.* None of the brides in Kurdistan whom I had an opportunity to observe appeared as radiant as we are accustomed to see in our cultures. The Kurdish brides either looked remarkably unaffected or else directly resentful. My interpreter's sister, whose wedding preparations and later wedding I witnessed, went about in the days prior to the wedding extremely unkempt and with an attitude of complete indifference. In reply to my question my interpreter told me that it is not the custom for brides to take any part in the preparations, and that out of regard for her future family no impression must be given of exploiting the working capacity of the young woman; in addition, the bride-to-be must not suggest, by paying too much attention to her appearance, that she is interested in being married. 585

In her study of weddings and marriages in Palestine, Granqvist probably provides an explanation applicable also to the Kurds, for she says[7] that it is the bridegroom who is happy, and with him his family and friends. Happiness prevails in the home of the bridegroom, the house of the wedding. A bride, on the other hand must bewail her fate. Is she not to leave her family home, and will not this home lose a member? Besides, Granqvist points out, it is considered highly unbecoming for a bride to evince happiness.

When, on the other hand, the marriage negotiations began in the case of my interpreter's brother and the wedding arrangements were being discussed, it was planned as a joyous festival, the house next door being borrowed and a dance arranged in its large courtyard. A later letter, dated 23rd August 1938, told me that 600 people were invited to the wedding, and that the dance had lasted from morning to night. As an unmarried son, his accommodation in the home was confined to a mattress which he spread out with the rest of the family, plus a niche behind a mirror for his few effects; his pyjamas (leisure and sleeping garment) lay, when not in use, rolled up on a chair in the guest reception room, which he also used for changing. In a word, he had had only a minimum of room at his disposal. When he married he and his wife would be allotted to their sole use one of the house's three living rooms. He and his wife, at all events initially, would form a cell within the family with a claim to space and a private life—a notable improvement of his position in the home. [554]

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*Marriage policy and marriage negotiations.* "Many families have wanted me", was my interpreter's reply to my question as to what possibilities she had had to be married. In other words she could boast of the fact that many families had applied to her[8] regarding the instigation of the marriage negotiations an essential a preliminary to a marriage in a Muslim area, where the world of men and women is divided, and a young man meets no women other than his nearest relations with whom marriage is precluded. 584

In the family home of my interpreter at Sulaimani I had an opportunity of watching at close quarters the marriage negotiations conducted by the young man's family with that of a possible candidate.

from which they enter, with high, narrow steps, led up. From the back wall of the room there were access to two smaller apartments, the one of which was to be the bridal chamber. Mattresses to sit on were spread out along the back wall for the reception of the bride, and under them was placed a lump of honey wrapped in a bread "pancake". It was stated that this should assure the gentleness and sweetness of the bride. Naturally, the women brought with them their children of all ages so the room was full to overflowing. The places of honour for the sheikh's wife and daughter were on the mattresses facing the back wall. Entertainment during the wait consisted of cigarettes of Kurdish tobacco and very sweet tea served by the youngest of the women present, a girl of about 12. Into this [illegible] milieu, where the hostess was the bridegroom's mother[1], came, when the car carriage was sighted, the bridegroom and one or two male relatives who, like him, had not participated in the fetching of the bride. They helped him to smooth a stick about 2 metres long with which he took up his stand on the edge of the roof just above the entrance door, surrounded by the women, who had stood up and gone across the roof to him. Ejaculations were passed round among the women, a lord was held ready by a woman standing at the side of the bridegroom. When the bride was taken out of the bridal car she was led towards the house, supported by her two female companions, the aunt and the midwife from her own home. Like the other brides brought to the village she had over her turban a reddish-yellow, transparent gauze veil hanging down over her face[2], reddish-yellow was also the predominant colour of her dress[3], which despite the great heat consisted of so many layers of clothing that she had difficulty in moving. The costume was without belt, but this was no exception as women often went without belts. It had therefore hardly the significance mentioned by Granqvist in the case of the Palestinian Arabs: that the absence of the belt was to make her prolific[4]. As the bride approached the entrance to the house and was about to cross the threshold, the lord was released and flew over her beating its wings; at the same time the bridegroom lifted the heavy stick, which he held in both hands, and gave her a powerful [illegible] on the shoulders and head, [illegible] more thereupon disappeared from the women's group and were not seen again so long as the guests stayed in the house. The bride was helped up the stairs by her two women companions, led across the room and given a seat on a mattress. The mother of the bridegroom bade her welcome by bending over her and placing her head first against her right, and then against her left, shoulder[5], whereafter the bride's reddish-yellow veil was raised and the women pressed around her in order to see the new member of the village community. It was stated that the bride and bridegroom had never seen each other before the wedding, and the only contact they had had so far was the blow given by the groom to his bride on her arrival at her future home. The bride's trousseau, purchased with the bride price, in this case supplemented by dowry given by the family, was carried up the stairs after her. The bridal chest (E. 2278) with a painted glass front, containing the rolled-up mattresses stuffed with cotton that were to comprise the marriage bed, and the unavoidable factory-operated window set, were carried into the room that was to serve as the bridal chamber.

The bride was tattooed on the back of the hand with three dots at the base of the little finger. Her finger tips were stained with henna as were also the palms, the latter being painted with a sun, a crescent moon and a star. She wore stockings, a thing [illegible] only are among Turkish women in Mosul, but it was not possible to know whether her feet also were henna-stained.

assured the institution which, as far as I could understand, hardly evoked higher than one gentleman of former days.

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The Hajj has in the month of ramadān began in 1937 on April 2nd. The thirty days during which the orthodox Muslim, whether man or woman, must refrain from eating food, solid or liquid, from tobacco, and from all sexual intercourse, from each time in the morning as it is possible to distinguish between a white and a black thread until sundown, I did not experience during my four months stay in Southern Kurdistan. Nor did I witness the concluding festival day, and the following six days, during which women who have had their menstruation period during the last month and as a result of this condition of impurity were unable to comply with the fast, can rectify this omission.

On the other hand I did see a woman fasting as her vow for a day as a result of a promise to do so[1], believing that by so doing she would bring good fortune to others. The day was July 26th, which, in 1937, corresponded to the first day in the month of pilgrimage. The fasting woman was the wife of the sheikh or Sayyid's. I noticed that although she abstained from eating, drinking and smoking the whole of a long, hot day, the temperature reaching 120°F., where abstention from drinking, particularly, demanded an unknown strength of will and self control, she attended to her domestic duties, which consisted, among other things, in milking goats, cooking and serving meals to a numerous family. Her fast was due to a promise given in connection with the participation of a relative in a pilgrimage to Mecca, the centre and holy city of the Islamic world, a long, expensive and still risky journey.

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We have now reached the 8th and last pillar of Islam, the pilgrimage, in the 12th lunar month. The Quran says in Sura 3, verse 97, that "pilgrimage to the House is a duty unto Allah for mankind, [illegible] unto him who can find a way". Of the women I met who had undertaken a pilgrimage some from the mountainous urban sullen. Of these there were several. In a joint family that owned various shops in the city and several large cars that were hired out, a woman, her husband and an 8 year old daughter had the year before taken part in a pilgrimage by plane: Damascus-Jiddā, and two other women in the same family group had made the journey with other pilgrims.

The most complete information about the pilgrimage was obtained from two women of about the same age who were married to the same business man in Erbil. Each had been a member of a group of pilgrims, one going the one year and the other the next. The one had taken a plane via Damascus to Jiddā, whilst the other had gone by bus across the Syrian desert to Beirut, and then by ship through the Suez Canal to Jiddā. In the latter case the journey had taken about two months and had cost about 300 Dīn. (say £300)[2].

In the same way that the returned male pilgrim mark the greatest experience of their lives and their changed position in society by a white band around their headdress, so Kurdish women wear discreet outside symbols after a pilgrimage. Even among women the head wear serve again as bands. The light band veil, shyāl, wear be worn over in the closer family circle, where other women are allowed to dispense with it. The arm, from elbow to hand, wear wear be shirts called which is

[illegible] normally the ones when the funeral-shaped cloth are tied together and thrown over the shoulder. The two women in question had brought back with them coloured photographs of the holy places, to be hung up in the home, and coloured silk scarves for friends and relations.

Whereas it was to the unreformed urban milieu that I was anxious who had undertaken the ordained pilgrimage, I had in Soleimani an opportunity to follow in a mixed urbanized and nonliterate urban milieu the base days in the twelfth month of the year, which are celebrated in the known whilst pilgrims are engaged in the visit and the ceremonies at Mecca connected with it. Four days around the 10th dul-hijja namely 9-12, which in 1997 were Monday 6th July to Thursday 10th July.

Pilgrims arrived at Mecca as early as Saturday the 7th (4th July 1997), and by entering the holy area, assumed a state of spiritualness and religious dedication. This is marked by the fact that the male has on two unstitched draperies, a shoulder cloth and a loin cloth. Dickson[7] states that the colour for men is white, whilst women's dress on this occasion must be green. Women must not be veiled[8].

On this day the Meccan pilgrim performs the seven-fold encirclement of the *ka'ba*, the carpet-covered, cubic "Allah's house", originally a heathen sanctuary, the corners of which are orientated to the four cardinal points of the compass. The encirclements, three of which must be performed running, begin at the black stone, the *ka'ba* being to the left, on the side of the heart. The black stone must be kissed or touched. Then comes prayer. The pilgrim now visit the holy spring, Zamzam, which gushed forth, a miracle, to refresh Hagar's son Ismail when he was dying of thirst. The seven-fold course between the two low hills, Safa and Marwa is performed in remembrance of Hagar, who here ran desperately back and forth, calling to heaven for water for her dying son, after she on the command of Sara had been sent into the desert by Abraham. The course is finished by hair-cutting at Marwa, where the women sacrifice the tips of their plaits.

I had no expectations of seeing whether there was anything in the tradition that [illegible] on the days' commission at Mecca. A meal was given in the middle of the day in my interpreter's house; other guests should have been present, but were unable to come. This, however, had no special connection with the pilgrimage.

The following day, Monday the 8th (7th July 1997) pilgrims leave Mecca on a four-hour camel ride to the plateau 'Arafat which they reach in the evening. It is recommended that the family in the home-land should fast on that day, but this is seldom observed. In my interpreter's home at Soleimani, as in other homes, a special kind of red cakes were baked, which were served on the day after, when visits were paid. These cakes were made in spoon-shaped, dual, wooden moulds, greased inside. The dough was gained into a flat disc, which was laid in the one half of the mould. A filling of chopped almonds, sugar and raisins was laid on top and the dough folded over it before the other half was laid on top like a lid, pressing the cake into shape.

On today the 9th (8th July 1997) the pilgrims spend in meditation on the plateau. It is recommended that a fast be observed in the homeland, but it rarely is. In Kordofan it was Children's Day. Children in hundreds swarmed all over Soleimani in new, sometimes ludicrous of which clothing. The flock of children was composed of boys and girls from 3-4 up to 12 years of age. Refuge had been set up on the outskirts of the town. However, the main purpose, for which they had been given pocket money, was to drive round in open carriages which that day were available for hire by groups of children. A

Bakhtiyari, and is called AMULE. It is composed of 40 flower-shaped links of silver, and measures, extended, 0.720 m. Inset between the links is a silver hanging bowl. It is this hanging bowl that Kurds call AMULE from which the whole chain has apparently gained its name[1]. From the chain hang two silver bells[2], two triangular amulet cases of silver[3], two small silver retaining rings[4], and two oval pieces of reddish-yellow cornelian[5].

The women wore necklaces. Two such have been brought back; the one (E. 2298)[6] is known as Kalmakan, 1.30 m. long. Amidst the 40 glass beads a grayish-white, spherical, agate bead[7] has been inserted to avert evil[8]. In addition, this necklace has hanging from it an amulet worn up to recently, which will be discussed when considering later that type of charm. The other necklace (E. 2291) called mihrabiya, length 1.40 m., comprises 38 elements consisting of beads of various colours and shapes, and two white snails shells. According to Chamakhaye[9] these are to avert evil. The necklace also possessed a large, cylindrical piece of stone again[10] and an amulet cover from a piece of brocade.

Among the broader jewellery for women are bangle ornaments intended for fastening to the turban among the coin chains (see ornaments). A set (E. 2294-2295) known as gal consists of two flat, oval, yellowish-red cornelians mounted in silver, greatest diam. 0.030 m., imported (it appears 6th cent. power of assorting evil on the cornelian in the child's necklace, and furnished with pendants of Iranian silver coins.

These decorative amulets are made by local craftsmen, and are worn either alone or mounted in necklaces. Their protective effect is due to their colour (blue), their shape (snail shells), their material (bells), or their material (cornelian, stone again or amyl).

*Enclosed amulets.* The other type of amulet is enclosed. The amulet itself (a piece of folded, yellow paper) is concealed in a case. This may be made of coloured material[11] like brocade, velvet or cotton, [illegible] of a square or triangular[12] envelope. It is worn by the women herself. This amulet case hung on a necklace worn by women[13] (E. E. 2298 and E. 2291, the amulet pendants of which measure 0.073 × 0.06 × 0.013 and 0.06 × 0.06 × 0.09 m., respectively). The capsule can be worn on to a fez, be attached by a safety pin to the waistcoat or to a child's costume. Each small pendant of material worn was in Kandjaran hung up on an inside wall to protect the house. The pouch can also be of metal, either a flat, triangular amulet box[14] like that already referred to, hanging from a child's shoulder (E. 2301), or like a cylinder[15] worn hanging vertically from the woman's waistcoat or in her necklace. An example (E. 2302) known as *Sila*, is 0.092 m. in length and has been struck (c.) a charm. It has a number of Iranian coins attached as decoration[16]. The pouches for these concealed amulets are either made at home, where it is a matter of previous mode of material, or by craftsmen if they [illegible] of metal.

On the other hand the ornaments, the amulet itself was, as far as I could ascertain, made by itinerant mullahs (cf. p. 108). I was able to watch the manufacture of two of such amulets in the aforesaid village Sellou. Two itinerant mullahs, recognizable by the green binding round their turbans, arrived one day at the home of the Sheikh of Tagaroua. On that day the village was visited by four wandering descendants of the Prophet, who called at various houses, where they did not appear to be uniformly welcome.

The category of thirteen lady men who is "predicatedly conspicuously clothed" appearing in villages as "treasures of native low status", is referred to in the case of the Kaiids by Barth, who notes that

[THE CONTINUES TOP OF P. 158--GWALYST]

992 they make "good-luck charms, love-charms, charms against sickness, etc."[4]. None of the grown-up men of the house were home at this time. The sayyids were not received in the guest room of the house in accordance with their station as strangers of a certain rank, that an exceptional exception could be done by the women when no men were at home. They came straight in to the family's courtyard, and were invited to sit in the three-walled central room where, rather coincidently, a dead lamb had been spread open—awaiting its return for flour and sugar emptied into the beggars' bags that the sayyids carried over their shoulders. These persons appeared to rank with the sheikh's servants. No refreshment was offered them, only a single cigarette. They were not regarded as honoured guests of the house.

992 The amulets were made whilst we watched. The one sayyid placed beside him a bottle of ink, asked the daughter of the house for two needles which he stuck in the sofa by the side of the ink bottle. He then produced from his dress an oblong piece of paper on which were drawn red lines, forming rectangular panels. These were filled in with figures, possibly also with words, but I was unable to distinguish this from the distance away I had to stand. On another piece of paper he took out was drawn a round. On the reverse side of this paper rectangular fields were made with red pencil strokes. These also were filled with figures. The paper was then folded like a triangular packet, the bottom corner being bent diagonally, and the paper was then folded together.

306 The amulets were picked up from the sofa, broken in the middle, and stuck into the triangular paper packet. The second piece of paper was also filled in with figures and then folded into a rectangular packet but without any bent corners. When the amulets were handed over to the women they were laid in a little box in which already lay other amulets not yet enclosed in material. The box was kept in a coloured tin box with articles of clothing belonging to the lady of the house. I was not allowed to view the amulets whilst wearing my spectacles. Should I do so, I was told, they would lose their power to protect the person bearing them or the house on whose wall it was to hang.

[illegible] with "written charms .... consisting of certain sentences of the Kur'an and names of God"[5]. So far as I could determine without glasses and at the distance I was forced to keep, the amulets, the making of which I had witnessed, were figure charms. That type is included in amulets, as in the case of the broken needles, is reported from Iran by Donaldson[6]. It did not appear that these amulets were made according to any formula. Amulet books are known from Afghanistan (E. 2/43), and, referring to a Kurdish book of prophecies, Mikkelsen[7] reports that "..... in ihnen [ihre drunter die spruchweise gute bis teilweise teilbaldige dann [illegible] ....".

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984 *Holy land.* Fjellberg[8] refers to the Lors having a rod with a small carved wooden head at the top, that was carried in the watchband of an old man who allowed it to pass from hand to hand of those present, whereupon it was kissed and then passed along the row check and then the other. A large wooden head, wrapped round with a flattering cloth of the holy green colour, was carried round in the village of Tegawra by one of the other four sayyids who were "working" the place at the same time. This man also tried later to visit the sheikh's house, but got no further than the steps up to the loggia of the guest house, where the daughter of the house had just started to shout. As he entered

293 562 [114] without a turban. At night it was removed with the cap. The neck-shoulder veil was worn by all married women in the three of the four female environments. On the other hand it had lost its position in the dress of the educated urban women, whether she was wearing a European dress or the most modern town-style Kurdish costume.

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[554] *The head veil of light material, gauze or voile was, in the case of a married woman, laid over the cap and turban as an extra. During prayer it was tied around the neck and head. Tied round at night in the same way, it replaced all other head covering. For an unmarried girl it was her sole headgear day and night. A 12 year old girl, the step-daughter in the sheikh's house at Tapawra, put on the veil as an experiment, which suggested that her age would shortly make it necessary for her to begin to wear it. This is the head cloth or veil to which Lane refers in regard to the Arabs in Egypt[1]. Within the village environment it was mainly white. The humble village women in Tapawra and Rakawa favoured white or turquoise whilst old women were black, joining the two upper corners together by a knot at the neck, having crossed them under the chin, so that the veil lay around the head like a hood. Certain villages were characterized by head veils of uniform colour: in the new flooded Kery hamlet of Mirza Rostem all were black and in Sargalu bright red.*

293 917 562 *In the two urban milieus the women of the house never went up the ladder to the roof or windows to arrange the bedding without the head veil, or a piece of material that resembled it, over the head; this applied to both adults and adolescents and even if the young and educated were wearing European summer dresses. Although my interpreter belonged to the educated urban milieu, she would not enter the guest room in her own home to greet Kurdish visitors who had come to talk to me, or bring a guest tea, without the head veil around head and neck. In the family circle and women's apartments women covered themselves with the head veil if a man entered. An educated teacher grabbed a chance head veil, covering herself with it at great speed when a man, newly-married into the family, came into the room. Although he was married to a half-sister of the young woman's brother's wife he must not see her head uncovered. Even in the village of Serkan my interpreter picked up the first veil she saw and threw it over her head when the master of the house, the old sheikh, came in to bid us welcome. Visiting her home a week after the wedding, a young educated woman wore a head veil in her father's presence (see p. 113). When her brother-in-law paid a first visit to her own home she also removed the head veil, although on that occasion she was wearing a short-skirted, armless European summer frock. The uneducated town women wore the head veil day and night.*

369 *The head veil was thus a general feature in the two female village environments and in the uneducated urban milieu. The veil was used sporadically in the educated urban milieu where a man's presence made this necessary, whether or not the woman was wearing Kurdish costume. European dress, it is true, revealed her legs to the knees and her arms to the shoulders, but the head still had to be covered.*

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293 562 *The yellow-robed "bridal" veil I saw worn on two occasions, both in a humble village milieu, when witnessing the arrival of the bride at the bridal house, in the one case walking the last stretch (Tapawra) and in the other riding on a white mare (Rakawa). The veil was so placed, over the married woman's*

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Hans MA11



## WOMAN'S POSSIBILLITY OF MOVEMENT AND SECLUSION

562 563 564 565 Possibility of movement or greater or lesser degree of seclusion. In the village aristocracy both the married and unmarried women left the area of the home but seldom. As an exception they could be the most distinguished guests at a village wedding. Here they remained in the women's group, strictly segregated from the men. There was no family in the village of equal birth on which they could pay calls. In this respect the women of the village aristocracy held a position similar to that of a lady of a royal family. Their domain comprised the rooms off the courtyard in which the house-work was performed and the roof. They could enter the guest house in order to clean, and could receive female guests there when the men were absent. Their area also extended to the kitchen garden and orchard of each colonel in the neighbourhood of the home. On one occasion in Tegazwa the wife and daughter of the sheikh's house extended their radius of action to the vineyard up in the mountains in order to pluck fresh vine leaves for culinary purposes. The wife of the house, but not the daughter, went on a family visit to Sulaimani. Both women, with the sheikh and his brother, paid a call, by car, on an Iraqi engineer working with European colleagues on the Dokan Dam Site. This man lived in a stone house similar to those inhabited by Europeans. During the visit the women remained in themselves in the bedroom of the house, which that day acted as the harem, the women eating, drinking tea, and sleeping there in the afternoon.

562 123 In the village of Serkan the lady of the house and the wives of the sons received my interpreter and me in the newly-built, detached guest house, which that day had been left to the women as a reception room. At the same time the men of the house were holding a meeting with the government representative of the Land Settlement Commission and a large number of peasants. For this male meeting a temporary open-air guest house had been arranged under some high trees near a spring behind the sheikh's property. Here the men took their meals, conducted their negotiations and spent the night on mattresses rolled out on the ground. During the morning, the representative of the Land Settlement Commission approached the women's apartments in order that I, as a European, could be introduced to his assistants. At the sight of this elderly man entering the women's apartments, the wife and daughters-in-law of the house sprang to their feet and fled as though for an outbreak of fire, assisted by a young husband present, over a narrow passage into a small store room. Similarly, although it had been decided, the lady of the house later cancelled a planned tour of the garden on the ground that there was a faint possibility of the men's party above mentioned being able to catch a glimpse of her face.

564 565 A proposal that the daughter of the sheikh at Tegazwa should accompany my interpreter, her 13 year old brother and me in a hired car and later cross the mountains by mule on a two-day visit to their own pastoral camp at Sargalu, was bluntly refused by the girl's father. The escort proposed was not considered adequate. Thus what we understand by seclusion was practised within the village aristocracy. Married women seldom left their homes, young girls practically never, and none of them were allow themselves to be seen by male strangers.

562 563 564 565 In the meantime the following categories of men were permitted access to the family house within the village aristocracy: Firstly, and naturally, the men of the family, the husband, brothers-in-law,

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Hard MA11



and sons. Secondly, distant relatives of the married couples. In addition the family's courtyard and three-walled central room were open to men who were subordinates of the sheikh, economically dependent on him, or of a status that could be compared with this. In Tepasova this included the peasants who ploughed and harvested the sheikh's fields and the drivers who drove the lorries he and his brother had in their capacity of contractors for the construction work at Dokan Dam. The house was also open to beggars and to nayyids. The sheikh families at Sergalu and Serkan had both men and women servants. With the latter family there lived permanently a *khizi malik*[1], who occupied the women's part of the house and who, it is true, ate with the women of the house but for whom he was paid by the sheikh and was thus a dependant. Men from the Gendarmerie, members of the Land Settlement Commission, and Europeans were not admitted to the family house where women were. These men were strangers by whom the women must not be seen. It can therefore be said that though seclusion is practised by the village aristocracy, it is in an elastic form that allowed definite categories of men, dependants in one way or another, access to the women's domain. This elasticity may help to explain the fact that Soane, disguised as a Persian merchant, and later, after the first World War, the British officers of the Mandate period, could be received by Hakkija's first lady, Lady Adela, who after Osman Pasha's death became the head of the family. That she regarded Soane, who took employment with her son and of whose nationality she was unaware, as a subordinate there is no doubt. If she also considered the British officers as subordinates compared with her own position as representative of the town's most distinguished family, she would not by meeting them sacrifice any of her dignity or step outside the framework of her seclusion.

My impression was that, in the aristocratic village milieu, seclusion was not so much the result of an order from the men as a wish on the part of the women not to be seen by male strangers.

The classic seclusion practised among the Kurds seemed to me to be far more like the British idea of "my home is my castle" than a form of incarceration. In consequence I do not believe that a male investigator is correct when writing that among the Kurds he visited in the Rowanduz district "..... the Aghas consistently make a show of being very strict about the seclusion and veiling of their womenfolk when strangers are present while countrymen, if they bother at all, are lax and casual"[2]. In my view it was the women themselves who felt the value of hindering male strangers from seeing them.

In support of this there is what a woman like Blackman says about conditions among the Egyptian *fellahin*: "To our western ideas such restrictions are apt to be regarded as a form of tyranny, but it is not a fair judgement. Seclusion is partly a sign of respect .... and indicates the value that the men put upon their womenfolk"[3]. As a result it is naturally in women's own interest to maintain seclusion. Incidentally, Lane reports of the Arab women in Egypt: "Still it might be imagined that the women of the higher and middle classes feel themselves severely oppressed, and are much discontented with the state of seclusion to which they are subjected; but this is not commonly the case; on the contrary, an Egyptian wife who is attached to her husband is apt to think, if he allows her unusual liberty, that he neglects her, and does not sufficiently love her, and to envy those wives who are kept and watched with greater strictness."[4] Barnes states something similar about conditions in India: "The Mohammedan ladies of South India are very strictly secluded, and are proud of it. They look upon it as a mark of respectful care, and are very contemptuous of women who are not taken care of in the same

4: Hainen E-S (1957) 1961 MA11 Hard MA11



were given, and while it is clear that the husband himself would look down upon such a wife, and that the public opinion would belittle her and therefore a high bride price is looked upon as a protection and a guarantee that a woman shall be honoured and well treated. Europeans have looked at the facts differently and said: so low is the position of the woman that she is bought. Most people among whom bride price is customary do not understand the Western ideal; their natural conclusion is that she is not thought to be worth a bride price. Here two completely different points of view clash and in each case only the objectionable in the opposite view is considered. It shows how much people's judgement depends on customs, which is no certain or absolute measure of value"[9].

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What is now being offered the Muslim woman in various areas, and what will be offered the Kurdish woman sooner or later, is the abandonment of a protected and valued position; she will be asked to renounce being an essential link in a man's career, the only means whereby he can raise himself to the more socially-valued married state.

Instead she will obtain the partial equality we know in the West, in place of the clearly-crowned special position based on the difference of the sexes, she will acquire a partial equality with the opportunity to compete with men in all walks of life. At the same time her efforts in the sphere that have hitherto been reserved to her will be correspondingly less prized.

As the industrialization of the country progresses, a large part of women's domestic activities will, as has happened in other countries, be transferred to trade with all its consequences, both good and bad. Her firmly-anchored culture pattern, sanctioned by religion, will collapse, though not by her wish, rather the reverse.

In the event of divorce and the adoption of monogamy, the ordinary home that has so far existed for children will be dissolved. The solitary, divorced mother and the deserted unmarried mother will become social features to be incorporated into the community structure, as it already is to the case in our culture, where the number of solitary women has now reached such proportions that it can neither be overlooked nor concealed. The elderly will not obtain a place in the joint family, and the homes will no longer be able to afford protection to girls. The paramount demand concerning virginity is only logically justified provided a home exists where the girl can dwell, protected from the difficulties of life, and her parents— and not herself—arrange her marriage.

The older members of the family are deprived of the right and duty to plan the marriages of the young and thus extend their family connections with consequent improved security for the individual. The emotional choice of a married partner will become universal. As the young gradually take their fate into their own hands they will neglect their personal responsibility for their elders, which will be taken over by the State.

When saying that women are "emancipated" in Islamic areas when the veil, and what it stands for, is abolished, this change in her way of life cannot be compared with what happened to the Western woman when emancipated at the turn of the century. It is true that the life pattern of Islamic women

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11



over tribesmen armed only with rifles and limited supplies of ammunition, and, with the advent of aircraft and new types of mechanical transport suitable for rough country, even their former advantage of superior mobility has passed to the forces of law and order. In any case, those of the old stormy petrels who are still alive have been softened by a growing dependence on the amenities of the towns and on modern luxuries brought within reach by improved communications, while their sons, most of whom have been educated in government schools, are tending to become dependent, like the rest of the new middle class, on regular employment in the army, the civil service, or the professions. Nationalistic agitation might perhaps seek to profit from any agrarian unrest, but apart from this it is likely to express itself in little more than the clandestine circulation of leaflets by societies calling themselves 'communist' or occasional localized riots by students and bazaar loafers.

Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of the past, Iraq is the one country where the existence of the Kurds as such has come to be officially recognized. In Sulaimani and Arbil especially not only is Kurdish the official language but the whole atmosphere of the administration is Kurdish. The sense of being at the mercy of an uncomprehending bureaucracy in a distant capital has been mitigated by a recent measure of devolution applying to the whole country, the Provincial Administration Law, whereby funds are placed at the disposal of, or may be raised by, the local authorities to be spent in accordance with policies locally determined. In spite of earlier handicaps Kurds have risen to the highest offices. One of the intellectuals imprisoned in 1931 has since held the portfolio of Education, and all the necessary books for the primary classes are now available in good, idiomatic Kurdish. A son of Shaykh Mahmud and one of the Shaykh's principal lieutenants, an officer of great ability, have been Minister of Social Affairs in different Cabinets. For two or three years past the Minister of the Interior (a key office, second only to that of Prime Minister) and the *Mutasarrif* of Mosul (the senior provincial governorship) have been Kurds born and bred in Sulaimani. Fair numbers of students are now being sent to Europe and America. If there was ever any justification for the old fear that the Kurds of Iraq would look north or east for their salvation, there can be very little in it now. The present Prime Minister, General Nuri al-Sa'id, has a comprehending and liberal approach to the Kurdish question. It is still too early to say that all the old wounds have been healed, but there seems to be a new spirit abroad that augurs well for the future.

• 554

[For additional information on status, role and prestige, see category 126, pp. 78-130 passim.]

Self-

548 respecting men should not engage in economic pursuits, their main
461 role was formerly that of warriors, protecting the people and flocks
554 from attacks by other groups. Only the very poor herded their own cattle. Where one person does not own enough animals to make up the normal herding unit of 100, composite herds are created along kinship lines, with father, brother, mum, etc. Differences in wealth are tremendous, apparently on a continuous scale, some persons owning a total of 2,000 animals, some as few as 10, some quite destitute and dependent on richer relatives for subsistence and work.

621 With the tendency towards parallel cousin marriage, every group
624 tends to split up into separate lineages, which continue separate over long periods of time. Thus semi-endogamous sections are created within the *tira* itself, usually identified with separate *khels*. But since the *khel* is a residential unit, the main unity of which stems from economic ties, persons of any lineage section may travel for longer or shorter periods with any *khel* to which their economic activities might attach them. Generally, one of these semi-endogamous lineage sections will form the wealthy core of a *khel*, to which a more or less variable group of less privileged families, related or not, are connected by economic ties.

622 These endogamous tendencies are also operative in the family of
624 the *Raïs*. The position as *Raïs* is inherited, and the family of the
631 *Raïs* therefore takes on the appearance of a noble class or caste. The process by which such a caste would truly emerge, however, would be through intermarriage with the «noble» lineage segments of other tiras. There seem in fact to be few such kinship ties established between *Raïs* families of different groups. A certain number of marriages will be exogamous as far as the *Raïs* family is concerned, if only from the occasional lack of available spouses in the limited family group. But these exogamous marriages more frequently establish ties between the *Raïs* and wealthy lineage segments among the «commoners» within the *tira* itself. It would thus seem that marriages are manipulated to reinforce the power of the *Raïs* within the *tira* itself, rather than to separate him off as a member of a distinctive and noble caste. To reify a distinction between «noblemen» and «commoners» within the *tira* would thus be an error, since the separ-

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

he also exercises certain rights in his relations with the landowner — he can e. g. exclude any newcomer from village membership.

Among the various villages in an area, or those belonging to one landowner, there is no attempt at coordination. My host owns among others, the three neighboring villages Hazar Mard, Decon and Darbaro in the Sulaimani valley. These villages share, for historical reasons, the usufruct rights to the surrounding area. Rather than making any attempt at concerted action in matters concerning them all, e. g. by meetings of the village headmen, there exists considerable enmity between the three villages. A marriage between the son of the *kikha* of Decon and the daughter of the leading family of Hazar Mard does not seem to have had any «political» results, and was probably manipulated to enhance the prestige of the *kikha* and his son in their own village.

## *GENERAL FEATURES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS*

The application of these formal political organizations, both of the lineage and feudal types, is modified by one basic principle, namely, the universal application of status difference, and the resulting lack of conceptualization of «the office», as apart from the total person occupying it at any one moment. An example might illustrate the point: Upon my arrival in the village of Decon, a small group of workmen were engaged in laying a brick floor in the local house of my host, the landowner. In their social classification of me, the only criterion available to them was the fact of my being his guest; so I enjoyed a reflection of his high status position, and consequently found myself in a relation of super-ordination with respect to the workmen. They found it necessary to interrupt their work unasked to perform personal services for me, e. g. serving me my tea, etc. The workmen, brought to the village for the sole purpose of laying the brick floor, had no feeling that theirs was only a part-role in the situation, where they were expected to perform a specific service and no more. The status of bricklayers is clearly inferior to that of friend-of-the-landowner; the fact that their contact was by virtue of their office as bricklayers did not release them from universal sub-ordination to the occupier of higher status. Wherever a

● 554 clear status difference is recognized, such an all-inclusive relation of super- and sub-ordination seems to result, and demands even of personal services by the possessor of higher status are thought reasonable.

422 554 In the formal organization, groups are clearly defined, on criteria of descent and residence, and each group is furnished with a named leader. But the nature of the leader's *office* remains rather vague; he is, in Max Weber's terms (Parsons 1941, p. 121), granted a liberal sphere of «arbitrary free grace». For a large part, the political leaders are not followed by virtue of their holding an «office», but are granted the right to make political, as well as other, demands on their followers by virtue of their higher status position — which wanes and wanes with the vicissitudes of fortune. Though the formal political categories are named and hierarchically ordered, the actual distribution and foci of power and control in the village and lineage remain quite fluid.

It is profitable in our analysis to make a distinction between *authority*, the more or less «legitimate» powers attached to a specific office or part-status, and the blanket term *power*, which depends upon the *total* status position of a particular individual, and his personal charisma (Weber, 1947), and is taken to cover the individual's total ability to lead or otherwise control the actions of other people.

This distinction is generally not made by the Kurdish villager, since, indeed, the abstract concept of an office is hardly developed; but it is useful in an analysis to distinguish the legitimate powers that belong with the office or part-status. The lack of a conceptual distinction in Kurdish thinking between authority in this sense and total power is evident in the almost complete absence of *lateral* relations between a specialized staff of functionals, in favor of a complete dominance of *line* relations of super- and sub-ordination.

Returning to the applicability of the term *authority* in such a system: The total status position of the individual, from which his power stems, is a product of *all* his part-statuses, not only in the political field, but also in other hierarchies (e. g. hierarchies of religious power, wealth and class status, etc, cf. p. 73 ff.). Any for-

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MAll Kurd MAll

mal, named political position, however, is connected with an approximate total status position as a sort of stereotype. The relative grading of formal political positions is vaguely defined, and the individuals of a village, through competing for the positions, will align in superand subordination according to this ruling. Thus certain ill defined demands and powers are *expected* (and therefore more readily submitted to) from persons occupying such positions. This amount of expected and generally unquestioned power is the authority that belongs with the particular position. The authority is thus not *derived* from the part-status, as it would if it were an office; it is brought to it. Persons occupying the position may at times not be able to exert it; nonetheless, in the formal political organization this authority and degree of ability to apply sanctions of some kind is assumed.

These considerations are applicable in both the tribal and the non-tribal political systems, and modify the expression that these systems take. The evident differences between Kurdish tribal and non-tribal structure are thus reduced, and the Kurdish segmentary lineage organization becomes in its actual application more similar to the Kurdish non-tribal organization than to the classical segmentary organizations, exemplified above by the Cyrenaica Bedouin. When combined with this principle of universal application of status difference, the segmentary structure of the lineage offers the framework for a hierarchical organization of leaders of segments. And these segments are residential and territorial units, as are the units in the non-tribal system. In the following, then, Kurdish lineage organization will be seen as a hierarchy of leaders of groups of increasing genealogical spread, rather than in the classical manner as whole segments in opposition.

The general characteristics of Kurdish political systems correspond in many ways to those of the *traditional* system of Max Weber (op. cit.). The rules governing the various positions in the hierarchy are not enacted, they are traditionally defined. «The order underlying a system of traditional authority always defines a system of statuses of persons who can legitimately exercise authority». The concept of the *office* is undeveloped: «Such a status is different from an *office*». It does not involve specifically defined powers with

642 the presumption that everything not legitimized in terms of the
• 559 order is outside its scope. So long as the encroachment of such a
status does not yet counter to the traditional order, . . . . . loyalty is
due, not to 'the order', but to him personally.» (Pareto, op. cit.,
p. 121).

The main contrast between the Kurdish system and this «ideal-typical» type lies in the implication in the definition of the latter that concrete traditional prescriptions are indeed accepted and agreed upon by all. The cultural homogeneity of the South Kurdish area has been emphasized above; this homogeneity makes for a situation where a truly traditional system can not operate. Any single concrete traditional prescription tends to be questioned by all but a minority, and conflicting interpretations of what is in fact the traditional order are constantly advanced. As a result, the theme of power attains an overriding importance, following the line of reasoning that if you can get away with something, it can't be very wrong. The effective check on excesses in the use of power is the threat of
681 murder. Though there is obviously much more control with this action, Kurds are rightly famous for being «trigger-happy», and a person who strongly feels that his rights have been infringed upon may go to great lengths to retaliate. Since no institutional means exist, violence has become institutionalized as the only mechanism at hand.

[78 It is tempting to see the present situation as the result of break-
642 down of a formerly functioning traditional system. There is considerable evidence indicating that Southern Kurdistan some 100 years ago was better integrated than today, in the form of a strongly
[78 feudal Pashalik centering around Sulaimani. The Baban Pashas of
682 Sulaimani had frequent opportunities during conflicts with both the Persian and the Ottoman rulers to show that they had the unquestioning support of an overriding majority of the population, and through several centuries of rule they built up a traditional hierarchy of hereditary status positions, assigning persons to principle offices (Rich op. cit., p. 111). The traditional nature of the rule is strikingly brought out in the following citation, where the Pasha of Sulaimani explains the solidarity that his subjects feel towards him by contrast-

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 NA11 Kurd NA11

## Chapter IV.

### Non-political hierarchical organizations.

(8) The theme of power is extremely important in Kurdish thinking,
• 59 in the sense I have used the expression *de-facto* power: the actual, total extent to which a person is able to lead people or otherwise induce them to act according to his wishes. There does not seem to be any single word in Kurdish to cover this concept, but, though a blanket term, it is found very useful in an analysis of Kurdish social organization. The Kurdish villager seems to object to feel that the total status position of a person, and the de-facto power that he controls, stand in a direct proportional relation to one another. At any rate, this is the manner in which status and prestige is described. The type of delegated power vested in the clerk of some large, bureaucratic department is not found in any local, autonomous hierarchy or organization.

Formal political organization constitutes the main hierarchy of institutionalized power relationships; but there are also other hierarchies of status positions, regulating other fields of activity. A high status position in these hierarchies affords the holder the right to apply certain sanctions, positive or negative, to persons inferior to him in the hierarchy. He is thus able to influence the actions of his fellow villagers in much the same way as a political office-holder; [illegible] power. I call the participation in a [illegible] political contributes to his total status, and to the power he controls, and thereby becomes a factor in deciding his position in the total power

hierarchy of his village and society. The formal political organization, discussed so far, is thus only one factor in the hierarchy of super- and sub-ordination in the village, and it must be related to the other formal organizations or hierarchies that exist.

However, this phrasing of the relationship makes use of distinctions foreign to Kurdish thinking. As stressed in the discussion of general features of formal political organizations, the concept of an office is underdeveloped, and relations of super- and sub-ordination spring from differences in the total status of individuals. The Kurdish villager is not concerned with abstract features of village organization — he sees the organization of his own village, and other organizations affecting him, in terms of hierarchies of individuals, of named and familiar people, each with a familiar total status. But to analyze the relationships and clarify some of the principles operative in this type of organization, it is necessary to break down these total statuses into component elements. Previously, the formal political hierarchies have been discussed. In the present section, non-ruler status positions and hierarchies will be divorced from their contexts in observed total statuses, and described. It is not implied that the total status of individuals is merely a sum-total of these part-statuses; the integration of such part-statuses into a total status will be discussed later, after the village scene, where such integration takes place, has been described. Our present concern is with the principles governing these various, analytically separable, hierarchies, and the part-statuses defined by these hierarchies.

There is a distinction to be made between these *hierarchies* of institutionalized positions of super- and sub-ordination in an organization — hierarchies of part-statuses — and a more general scale of prestige. A person's prestige depends on the degree to which he approaches certain ideals; and one may distinguish between various such scales, relating to degree of piety, age, wealth, etc. The prestige that accrues to the individual from high rating on such scales is convertible into influence and power; part-statuses in a hierarchy, on the other hand, give power directly. To complicate the situation further, high rating on a scale of power might also be said to contribute to a person's prestige. Several scales have been implied in the

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 NAII Kurd NAII

554 631 previous discussion, and are indeed implicit in the systems of status hierarchies. An attempt will be made to relate the various status positions to ideals expressed on such scales, and in the final paragraphs of the section to outline the main scales on which individuals may be rated.

ECONOMIC CLASSES

565 631 The village hierarchy of class differences, based on division of labor and attendant differences in wealth, has been discussed above, pp. 20 ff. This hierarchy is, as we saw, produced primarily by the *feudal principle of delegation* of work on the land, and is conceptualized in terms of distinct social classes, each with traditionally defined rights and privileges in their relations to each other. Each class is thus a status category, and they are arranged in a hierarchy leading from *laborer* through *tenant farmer*, occasionally an *intermediary capitalist*, and culminating in the *landowner*. This is in itself a power hierarchy, since each superior status directly gives opportunity for control over persons of inferior status positions, within the traditional limits. The *freeholding farmer* class, on the other hand, occupies a status partly divorced from this immediate power hierarchy. Characteristically, where such freeholding farmers are found in a village partly controlled by a large landowner, every effort seems to be made on the part of the landowner to secure property rights also to the remaining fraction of land, and thus place all members of the community in the unambiguous hierarchy of control and power. Consequently freeholding farmers with property of any significance are generally found in tribally organized communities, and a dichotomy between only freeholding vs. only tenant communities generally holds true. *Freeholding farmers* as a class tend to be on a par with the *tenant farmer* class in the larger class system, and frequently control a small group of *laborers*, and in certain areas also the serf class, the blacksmiths. The socio-economic relationships between these classes have been sketched previously.

565 631 393 649 The special position of the *shepherd* remains to be discussed. He is essentially a laborer, working for a stipulated annual payment in kind (grain), but also receives a share of unlicensed brand daily

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

In the next life, Mohammed will pray for all derwishes, ask God to give them pardon. To become a derwish you must renounce all the faults and evil thoughts and acts of men, and always be good. Anyone can become a derwish — young, old, man, woman. So he went to the great Sheikh Kader. And the *Sheikh* advised him to be good, always; he told him to protect Islam, follow all the ethical rules, etc. He stayed only five minutes the first time — the *Sheikh* only takes your hand in his, tells you all the rules of derwish, and blesses you. Then afterwards, you pay him regular visits, as often as you wish — once a month, or every two months, or even once a year. Sometimes you give gifts to the *Sheikh*, though you don't ever have to.

There thus seem to be no elaborate, much less mystic, rites of initiation to membership, as reported from e. g. the Persian area. The only visible sign of derwish-hood among men (who in fact form the great majority of followers) is letting your hair grow long — though there are, incidentally, no special taboos or precautions connected with cutting it.

The explicit logic and ethical position of the group, and the motivation for persons to join it, thus seem quite simple. Between the various derwish groups there is little room for conflict, since their differences are not dogmatic, but merely a question of the efficacy and greatness of the holy powers of one holy man as compared to an other. Similarly, except for the fundamental approach, which would rarely be questioned by the uneducated villager, there is no dogmatic conflict with the official church — the same ethical and ritual rules are propounded by the Derwish Leader and the mullah, and any further admonishments and elaborations introduced by the one merely serve to support this fundamental body of ritual. The more heterodox interpretations attached to this common body of ritual are generally overlooked by the mullah as lying largely outside his domain.

But it would be overlooking a very important aspect of the derwish organization if these statements were taken at their face values, and it were seen merely as a more emotional and personal interpretation of Islamic doctrine; as being a religion of the disinherited

7: Barth E-S (1951). 1953 NA11 Kurd NA11

in the same way as are numerous of the smaller sects of the Christian church. On the contrary, the theme of *power* is stressed and elaborated, corresponding to its importance in the Kurdish value system, and the more conventional religious possibilities largely played down. Great religious fervor is generally lacking among the villagers, even among derwishes. Fraser (no date), an early traveller in the area, notes with disappointment the lack of superstitions, fear of ghosts, etc. among his Kurdish friends. In accord with this, the point that is stressed is not contemplative or mystic, but might be said to be the aspects of potential power resulting from closeness to God, with great interest in the *overt* signs of this potential, covert power. It seems to satisfy the subjective needs of the underprivileged group, not by being an escapist religion of the next life, but by offering its adherents a present substitute for the highly valued political and economic powers they can not attain. To demonstrate the efficacy of the great powers they control, the derwishes rely on certain signs, the most important being their ability to do wierd and amazing things, generally feats of the type one associates with Indian fugirs.

The pattern of the delegation of this power illustrates something of its nature. It all centers in the Sheikh, in the present example Sheikh Abdul Karim. He belongs to the same family as Sheikh Mahmud, and traces descent as well as the origins of his powers through the revered Kaka Hamma, from whom also Sheikh Mahmud has received his sacred powers. The immediate predecessor of Sheikh Abdul Karim was his father, Sheikh Kader — a man of considerable influence and intellect (he accompanied Sheikh Said on their so successful visit to the Sultan, cf. p. 42). Succession to the position as Leader of Derwish is by appointment by the Sheikh himself. No rule of primogeniture is observed (Sheikh Abdul Karim is the second of three brothers), the person showing the greatest ability is chosen. This need not be a son, though it usually is — naturally, it must be within the family, since descent from the Prophet is essential.

There seems to be an unresolved problem here, in that the sacred powers are part of the «biological» inheritance of the descendants of the Prophet, yet vary in strength between different lineages of them. And these lineages may increase or decline in power over a

791. The father of the present Sheikh is said to have used his influence
• 559 with considerable effect — certainly, a very exhalted status is associated with the position as Leader of Derwish, as far as the village population is concerned.

The individual derwish, on the other hand, has no recognized or defined status. The relative position of the derwish in the village community will be discussed more fully below, where it can be related to the other hierarchies of organization. Being largely recruited from the most underprivileged sections of the population, membership in the derwish group is often regarded as a badge of the lowest class. In face-to-face relations they are, on the other hand, afforded a certain respect, springing from an undeniable awe or fear of their strange powers.[*]

[791] Where the service of a mullah is undesirable, the local derwish tends to function in his place, by virtue of his assumed greater knowledge of religious ritual. Thus a derwish who is generally accepted as being knowledgable, may attain some status, but that primarily by virtue of his knowledge, and not qua derwish. Thus, the power obtainable through membership in the derwish brotherhood is mainly of a subjective and substitute kind. Their special powers are of a symbolic and expressive, not of an instrumental type. Strikingly, these special powers and strange fears are exhibited mainly in newly exclusive derwish meetings, and are rarely directed outward, toward village spectators — though secrecy, on the other hand, is made no point of, and any one who wishes to be present may attend most

[*] Something of the position of the derwish may more clearly be illustrated by a summary characterization of the derwishes with whom I came most into contact (not including those residing in the home village of the Leader of Derwish):
a) Highly eccentric, with considerable respect. Officiated as occasional funerals etc. Reputed to be able to perform charms and sickness with spells.
b) Rather inconsequential. Sacrificed a sheep when his watch (unique in the village) started showing discrepancy with the sun — was ridiculed for this by fellow villagers.
c) and d) Quiet, ordinary wife in appearance. Accused of rehearing spells. Possessed handbook.
e) Unintelligent brother of village headman. No special accomplishments.
f) Ordinary farmer. No special accomplishments.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 WAll Ford WAll

meetings. We are left with a religious brotherhood, vested with mystic powers, but where membership is regarded as a badge of low social status. The various overt signs of these mystic powers are not systematically manipulated in front of an uninitiated audience, to enhance the position of the performer; nor is the brotherhood developed into a secret society, the secrecy and exclusiveness of which might give status. The interpretation followed here, that membership in the brotherhood offers subjective satisfaction, giving the underprivileged person a field in which he feels that he too can manipulate and control power, seems the only constructive alternative.

*Sheikhs and Seyyids.* The category of persons called Sheikhs and Seyyids are, as the dervishes, in a somewhat ambiguous position, but they may, as we have seen in the case of Sheikh Mahmoud, make use of their position to great advantage in the political field. Essentially, a Sheikh is in Kurdish a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, reckoned patrilineally from Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law, and corresponding to the Arabic Seyyid. The general position of esteem in which such persons are held is indicated by the term itself, Sheikh in Kurdish being borrowed from the Arabic, where it is a political title for tribal chief or elder; Seyyid in the Arabic of pre-Islamic times having the similar meaning of elder. Actually, both the terms Sheikh and Seyyid are used today in Kurdish to indicate descent from the Prophet — a distinction between the two will be made later; the present discussion will concern the Sheikhs, who in Southern Kurdistan are by far the larger and more important of the two groups.

By virtue of their descent from the Prophet, Sheikhs rate high on a religious scale of sanctity, and it is believed that they embody a variable degree of unseen good power. This vague sanctity is however divorced from implications of greater piety; no significantly greater morality seems to be expected of the Sheikhs, and membership in the descent group does not economically affect the social position of an individual.

To clarify the position of the Sheikh group, its distribution and internal structure should be examined. Logically enough, Sheikhs are not found among members of tribes (*ilwar*), since tribal groups constitute patrilineal maximal lineages, and no member of the *ilwar*

can trace patrilineal descent from AS unless the whole tire claims such descent. None of the South Kurdish tires arrange this, however. Shaikhs are consequently characteristic of the non-tribal areas, where they occupy the whole gamut of social positions from landless labourer to feudal lord.

In characteristic Kurdish fashion, Shaikh families tend to split up into small endogamous lineage segments, and, though the census materials gathered from a few villages is not statistically reliable in the matter, there is strong suggestion that FaBrDa or other close kin marriage reaches considerably higher frequency than usual in tenant villages, and approaches that found in the politically organized lineages, the tires. However, any exhaustive organization uniting the whole Shaikh descent group, or major segments of it, such as would in fact convert it into a type of widely dispersed tire, is lacking. It would on the other hand be equally misleading to think of the Shaikh group as an endogamous caste, since extra-group marriage do in fact take place, and the emphasis is not on Shaikh endogamy but, in usual Kurdish fashion, on local lineage endogamy. It is convenient to think more in terms of these local endogamous Shaikh lineages, where they are found in the village community, and relate their comparatively higher endogamy to an effort to retain a special status in the local community by not dispersing kinship obligations too widely in that community. Where Shaikh families occupy higher social positions, this stress on lineage endogamy tends to disappear, or seems to reflect efforts to prevent the dispersal of family property through the multiple Koranic inheritance rights.

An example of a Shaikh lineage group of tenant farmers, residing in a small village community, might be given. Of 11 households in the village, 7 are of the Shaikh lineage, the remaining 24 belonging to various larger and smaller kin groups. Of the heads of these 7 Shaikh households, 4 have married a FaBrDa, 2 another close relative, and only 1 a non-relative from outside the community (the sister of a neighbouring headman). At least in this generation, there is thus no intermarriage with other families in the local community.

The head of the Shaikh lineage is regarded as the most important man in the village, but he is not elected kikhe (village headman).

7: Barth 8-8 (1951) 1953 MAII Kurd MAII

The present *Aškha*, whose father and grandfather held the post before him, belongs to another, slightly larger kin block, counting at least 9 households. Furthermore, the frequency of family endogamy in this family of which the *Aškha* is the head is less than 10 %, which may account for his weaker appeal in the community. Thus the emphasis on the special status of the Shaikh lineage also tends to relate this lineage, in part to their disadvantage.

The majority of the Shaikhs in the village are tenant farmers, and tend to be among the better situated. One occupies the position as *mullah*, to which his son will closely succeed him. However, one of the Shaikh household heads is a landless laborer, giving a class distribution in the Shaikh lineage of 3 farmers / 1 laborer, as compared to 18 farmers / 4 laborers in the remainder of the community. The class position of the Shaikh lineage as a whole is thus not significantly high.

The status of this small Shaikh lineage might be contrasted to that of the above mentioned Leaders of Derwish, or to that of Shaikh Mahmud, both of whom have achieved their high position in part by virtue of their descent from the Prophet. The most reasonable generalization seems to be that membership in the Shaikh descent group defines a type of position in the religious field which contributes to the general esteem in which a person is held, and which may, in certain situations, contribute to justify a high position of actual power, but which in no way automatically ascribes such power to the individual.

A category of travelling holy men, similarly claiming descent from Mohammed, are given the Arabic name Seyyid by Kurdish villagers. Whereas the Kurdish Shaikhs claim descent specifically from Hussein, one of Mohammed's two grandsons, through a medieval Persian theologian, the claims of the wandering Seyyids are more variable. On the other hand, this reference to religious sanctity forms the basis of their livelihood. The spellbinder Shaikh need only imply high rating on a purely religious scale of sanctity — Seyyids convert this into a definite status position, fundamental to their occupation. Preferably conspicuously clothed, and wearing green head-dress as a symbol of their status, they ride from village to village carrying old

[illegible] holy books from which they can tell of the past and the future. [illegible] They also sell good-luck charms, love-charms, charms against sickness, etc. Being residents of the larger towns, however, they only appear on the village scene as transients of rather low status.




Diagram No. 6. The scales and measure of the religious field.

[illegible] The Mullah. Whereas the position of a Mullah depends upon his rating on the scales of sanctity and sacred powers, the position of the mullah is related to the scale of sanctity, and to a scale of learning and piety. High rating on the scale of sanctity springs directly from the office, while the degree of learning and piety depends upon the individual's behavior, and is consequently variable.

[illegible] The position as mullah is a true status position, since it defines a place in an institutional hierarchy — that of the larger church organization — but since it is related also to the scale of piety, the actual relative status ascribed to specific mullahs in their villages may vary considerably. Thus again, the lack of development of the concept of an office has its effects; any separation of the individual's official and private capacity is impossible, and no clear definition of the status of the mullah, as divorced from the individual achievements of a specific mullah, is possible. The very weak regional organization of the church is in part responsible for this — indeed, it is

misleading to speak of an indistinct church organization in the sense one knows it in the West. The actual qualifications of individual mullahs vary tremendously, and financial arrangements for the support of the Mosque are, as far as village mosques are concerned, entirely in the hands of the local community. Yet traditionalism and informal controls give a certain unity and enforce certain limits on deviations from a vague norm. 793 795 539

The position as mullah is an achieved status with completely open recruitment. Successful application to the study of the Koran leads eventually to initiation. There is a tendency for Sheikhs and Seyyids to be over-represented, but this seems primarily due to a higher frequency of religious inclinations, resulting from their economic bias in education. Frequently a dervish will be willing to support his son through some or all of the necessary years of reading and study, and thus achieves for the son what was beyond the reach of the father. At times, through an early interest in the teachings of the village mullah, a boy in a secularly oriented family will find his way into the religious field. A striking number of the students are blind, and depend in their studies on the help of their friends. 535 793

The traditional pattern is for the student to spend an unspecified number of years roaming from mosque to mosque, seeking out the teachers of high repute and remaining with each for whatever length of time he wishes (see Appendix III). In this period, as well as studying the Koran and the legal interpretation of the text, the student should become familiar with other religious writing, in Persian as well as in Arabic. Finally, when the student and whatever teacher he happens to be with at the time feels he is prepared, he is made to give a sermon, and after a circuit is given the white headdress of the mullah, as well as a diploma confirming his status.

During his studies, the future mullah is dependent on his family or on individual charity for his subsistence. Later, as a full-fledged mullah, he must make whatever arrangements he can. The positions in the mosques of the towns are now government supported, but in the village the office is supported by local resources only. The community expresses its wish to have a mullah and the extent of its ability to pay — generally by revenue on dedicated land and a 793 537

7: Earth E-S (1951) 1953 MAII Rural MAII

minimal tax pr. head in the village, payable at the end of the holy month of Ramadan. This frequently must be augmented by agricultural work on the part of the mullah. It seems that the villagers are free to appoint any initiated mullah of their choice to office; once he is appointed, however, it is, at least in practice, impossible to dismiss him.

The actual role of the village mullah is evidently today in a state of rapid change, and considerably reduced as compared to Ottoman times. He has been relieved of a great number of his civil functions — e. g. marriages are not valid unless a license has been procured from the civil administration, and though the mullah still performs the ceremony, his importance is naturally reduced. The very dominant position as judge has also been greatly reduced by the secularization of the state and effective administration of Iraq's civil code.

A second role is that of the educator — the mullah will give rather intellectual lessons in the Koran to the sons of important villagers — the only schooling they will ever have — and he may also have advanced students visiting him for a period. Except for spreading a certain knowledge of the religion, however, this school of the mullah's does not seem to be of any great consequence, and the mullah himself remains the only literate person in the village.

His main role at present parallels that of the priest in Western society, in that it is concerned predominantly with religious questions in a largely secular world. The mullah calls to morning and evening prayer, gives a sermon on Friday, is especially active in the holy month of Ramadan. In all his activities, he should set an example to his villagers. The weight given to his opinions thus depends on his learning and personal piety, but at the same time, if they are developed to any appreciable degree, these same traits will tend to separate him physically and emotionally from the community and place him in the position of a spectator.

Consequently, he does not achieve the power position in the village that one might have expected. The mullah with low rating on the scale of learning and piety will be disregarded by the villagers — they may not even attend his services, as in the case of one village studied, where the sermons had been largely discontinued and the

.7: Barth E-S (1951) 1955 NA11 Kurd NA11

responsibility for religious education taken over by the leader of the local Shaikh family. On the other hand, an intelligent mullah, though often formalistic and introvert in his orientation, may play a considerable part in improving the intellectual and moistory standard of the village (the subject of chess and taichess having importance in a religious context), but does not seem to attempt to extend his influence any wider. His high intellectual standard and foreign values tend to alienate him from the epery squabbles of the village; and an ambitious attitude has no real place in the piously fatalistic Islamic world view. To the extent he does not convert his status and prestige into a de-facto power position, the mullah might be said not to be fully integrated into the social structure of the village. He is similarly in no sense an indispensible resident in the village community — very frequently, he is called in only for funerals, naming ceremonies etc., or these functions may even be performed by a local dervish or Shaikh. The pattern of training blind boys, necessarily marginal to village society, as mullahs, may in part be related to an appreciation of this marginal position which the mullah occupies.

*Hadji*. The *Hadji*, on the other hand, is an ordinary member of the village community. His position is related to the scale of piety, and derives simply from having completed a pilgrimage to Mecca. The title, however, is one of considerable respect — in part because it also implicitly indicates high rating on the scale of wealth.

The whole institution of the pilgrimage is the result of the command by the Prophet Mohammed, that any man who has the necessary means to make the pilgrimage *and* support his family at home, or whose family is able to support itself without him, should make at his lifetime journey to the holy city of Mecca. Thus the title of *Hadji* indicates (a) a pious eagerness to follow the command of Mohammed, and (b) moderately prosperous circumstances. One rarely finds more than 3—4 *Hadjis* in any one village; these will tend to be at least among the leading members of their community.

Formerly, the initiative was individual and the journey hazardous, often achieved by relatively greater physical exertion and low expenses, and the title of *Hadji* was thus less of a symbol of wealth [illegible] at present.

§§ 198 199 than as present. The route from the Sulaimani area went by caravan to Basra in the Persian Gulf, by ship to Jiddah (or even by caravan across the Arabian peninsula) and on foot from Jiddah to Mecca — involving often more than a full year of travel. Today, the time expended is in the neighborhood of two months, travel being by bus to Baghdad and across to Beirut, ship through the Suez to Jiddah, and bus up to the walls of Mecca. Total expenses average some £ 200. The pattern is generally one of group travel — in 1948, a group of approximately 40 persons from the Sulaimani area journeyed together.

§ 197 The moral-religious status connected with the title of *Hadji* is of negligible importance. There is some feeling that in situations of party conflict, a *Hadji* should attempt to mediate, and that higher moral standards are to be expected from him. More important is its connections with wealth as a type of conspicuous consumption, and in this is possible the widely distributed type of honorific title dependent on having gone through a «pre-Incke series of feasts»[1]. However, in the competitive and informal Kurdish village organization, the honorific title of *Hadji* is not by itself of any appreciable consequence in the de-facto power hierarchy, and must be supported by a continued position of relative wealth.

## KINSHIP

§ 72 In addition to the formal hierarchies governing the political, the economic, and the religious fields, there remains the field of kinship. It might be pointed out that the household organization, and immediate kinship obligations, described above pp. 29 ff, represent a hierarchical organization of kinship the same type, but relating to a unit smaller than the village, in contrast with the other, more extensive organizations. Needless to say, the patriarch of a large household gains prestige and is vested with de-facto power by

[1] An example from a culturally and geographically parallel area is offered by the Kafirs of Afghanistan, where the whole social structure of the village community is based on a hierarchy of such honorific titles, attained by giving stipulated numbers of feasts (cf. G. S. Robertson, 1896, pp. xlvi ff.).

592 view of his position in the household — prestige and power that contribute very significantly to his total status in the village community.

SCALES

• 577 I have used the term office for an actual formal position in an organizational hierarchy; status and part-status for this position and the prestige that belongs with it. In a system where the rights and privileges connected with a political office are not clearly defined, and a separation of a person's private vs. official capacities is impossible, the power of a political official, or other person in a status hierarchy, will in large part depend on the particular person holding the position. In a sense, there is negligible prestige attached to the position itself; an individual must, in his private capacity, embody the prestige that is necessary to fill the position successfully. Thus the variegated sources of prestige outside the formal hierarchies become important to an understanding of how the formal structure functions in the village.

One may, as suggested above, profitably think in terms of certain scales by which persons are evaluated, high rating on these scales conferring prestige to the individual. Such scales are of several types, some connected with the life cycle of the individual, or related to the degree to which certain attributes are found in a person, others measuring the degree to which an individual approaches a certain ideal stereotype in his behavior. They may in part define conflicting or mutually exclusive ideals. — Put differently, this means that the prestige derived from high rating on one of these scales may be particularly relevant in a certain organization or role, as in the case of seniority and its relation to the khedrā status. Other scales are more universally applicable, as that of relative age. However, no matter what its sources may be, *the prestige of a person qualifies him for a certain relative power position in the village, potentially or actually formalized as a named status position.*

Obviously, any number of these scales may be constructed, and the present list pretends to do little more than enumerate certain

• 564 important Kurdish values relating to individual prestige. On the other hand, they are not pure constructs of the investigator, since they do represent verbalized ideals which the Kurdish villager is aware of as alternative modes of behavior in situations. The following are some important scales on which the prestige of a Kurdish villager may be measured.

*Family:* (a) prestige derived from descent from a person or persons with high prestige, or (b) membership in a large effective kinship unit.

*Age:* prestige derived from experience and maturity, increasing up to the onset of senility.

*Sex:* dichotomy favoring the male and relations in the male line.

*Wealth:* prestige from capital, real or movable property, and occupations tending to produce such.

*Sacred powers:* the extent of supernatural powers from Good Forces delegated to the person.

*Sanctity:* the actual embodyment of sacred powers, or sacred position achieved by personal suffering and renunciation of the world.

*Learning and piety:* prestige from knowledge of, and conformity to, Moslem religious and moral ideals.

*Honor and Bravery:* the degree of approach to the Kurdish ideals — physical prowess, valor, a certain nobleness, respect for women, kindness to the poor, unending hospitality, etc.

### THE VILLAGE HIERARCHY

565 The formal political structures, and certain subsidiary hierarchies have been outlined, and it was pointed out how the actual power connected with positions in these hierarchies is dependent upon the prestige of the persons occupying them. The organization of the village thus becomes one of super- and sub-ordination of individuals, and universal relevance of status differences in the relations of these individuals.

However, because of the presence of several separable hierarchies of organization, the village relations of super- and sub-ordination do

ties that may be discerned. The village, in all its confusion, sets the 631
scene on which the competing factions act out their parts; ever
faintly glowing fires of unwilling individuals are discerned and
appraised in terms of the ideals espoused in the above outlined
codes; control is exaggerated and leadership emerges. All these activi-
ties take place at more or less standardized occasions — and it is
these occasions that will be described in the present chapter. In
effect, any type of community or group activity gives an oppor-
tunity for status and competition to express itself, and a descrip-
tion of these occasions thus becomes virtually a description of com-
munity life.

## INFORMAL GROUP FORMATION

Clarence James Rich, visiting Baluchistan in the 1820's, was sur- 574
prised at the regularities of the patterns of visiting, as the large
groups that would congregate in the house of some noblemen or
in the open, and spend their time smoking and drinking tea, while
talking way into the small hours (Rich, op. cit.). This pattern is
also found strongly developed in Baluchistani today.

In the village, the formal hours of course keep rather different
hours, and he invariably rises with the sun; but the same pattern is
discernible. In the summer nights, visitors may be received on the
roof-tops; in the daytime, or when the weather is colder, any impor-
tant visitor is showed to a special room, and a more or less standard
group will quickly congregate. In the hot weather, other kinds of
groups will congregate during the day in any bit of shade — under
the trees by the pool, or on the roof-tops that are shaded by trees.
These informal groups seem essentially of two types, one the group
of village leaders in the unofficial sense to borrow an idiom
from American politics, the other a less clearly defined standing
category of persons of lower status.

*The unofficial room.* In the traditional tribal system, the 574
*Agha* of the village should keep a guesthouse, in which the heads of 574 •
families, all kinsmen of the *Agha*, and any visitor have a right to
sit. In the area around Kuwandun, this seems to be an institution of

considerable economic importance, and a source of much prestige for the hospitable *Agha* (Leach op. cit., pp. 28—33).

The practice in South Kurdish area differs somewhat from the ideal — it would be a very important man who went to the expense of keeping an open house in a special room; men of such importance and means are no longer found as residents in the villages. The typical *Agha* among the Hamawands will receive visitors in a small room, kept clean and reasonably empty for the purpose; the hospitality extended to the visitor is out of all proportion to the means of the host, but is not normally extended to all persons who would have a right to sit in the guesthouse. Similarly, from being the common centre of the village, to which all the important men repair, it has become in fact the centre of only a faction in the village, though admittedly the most important one. This development is of course carried further in the non-tribal villages, where every man of any importance arranges to utilize a certain room as a guesthouse, playing the role of host and senior member among the individuals who normally congregate there.

No matter what time of day a visitor arrives, he should at least be served tea. There is a formal pattern of etiquette attached to this, which unfortunately for the visitor who tries to be polite varies between different areas — some places, one is expected to leave after the third glass, other places they insist that the only polite thing is to drink seven or even eleven glasses in a sitting. The act of distributing of the tea gives an opportunity to express the prestige scale by the sequence in which people are served; also, in the presence of a visitor, everyone is careful to use the proper honorific titles to one another. All the time, cigarettes of dry Kurdish tobacco are smoked, the men crowd together in the half darkness and argue agitatedly, the fire smolders and smokes, and the atmosphere quickly becomes extremely heavy.

The persons assembling normally in the embellished room are the policy makers of the village or a main faction of it. In this forum, all matters of common interest are discussed, the actions of the various members of the group co-ordinated, and opinions and plans crystallized. Within the group, of course, relative prestige is

community concerned, and rivalry between members is directed towards out-doing each other in the eyes of the group as a whole. 534 ●

*Kinship society.* An other immediately apparent type of informal group which is commonly formed is that of *kinship society*. The unskilled room houses a more polite and essentially closed society; kinship society includes more diverse persons, and emerges from practically any aggregation of individuals who are not engaged in productive pursuits. There is a tendency for the individuals of the highest prestige to stay away from such groups, since the joking and horse-play may be rather personal and quite free, and the rules of superior behavior easily forgotten. Thus, though formed from an open aggregation of individuals, which any male commoner as well as villager may join, it develops in practice into a gang of village youths and men, primarily the younger and more irresponsible, and the men of lower class status.

The same problems that are debated in the unskilled room may also be discussed here, but with less stress on policy forming and more stress on the anecdotal. Prestige differences in the group emerge very clearly from who is made fun of and who finds in a position to conform. At the same time, the group serves as a forum for complaints against abuses. Here the attitudes of the less privileged sections of the village to specific issues become coordinated; pressures are applied and excitements created that may lead to concerted action where persons feel they have been badly wronged.

*Women's groups.* Women are excluded from both these types of groups, as well as from *qahwah* activities in general. Though they prepare the food that may be consumed in the unskilled room, they should not show themselves there, and, for example, un-knowing, which should be done on the spot, is in the hands of a younger male kinsman of the host. In fact, when a visitor arrives in whom they take an interest, they may find domestic work to do within earshot though out of sight, or a small son of the house is dipped in as informant. The actual extent to which women contribute in shaping the opinions of their men is difficult to evaluate, and surely varies considerably, but is usually probably slight. On the other hand, they have access to information, especially gossip, 562, 573 [572]

which the head of the family has son, and may thus be of some importance. The main aggregations of women where such gossip is exchanged are found around the water-hole, where water for the house is fetched, and clothes washed and beaten. The actual visiting between women seems predominantly to be limited by kinship, most frequent are the daughter's visits to her mother. Such visiting is concentrated in the hours just before noon, when the men are occupied and there are no pressing household duties.

In everyday life, there are thus three types of larger groupings that provide a forum for factionalism and leadership: (a) the men of high prestige congregate in who unskilled women, (b) the men of low prestige get together in an informal coaching manner, and (c) the women of the community meet and gossip by the village water-hole. None of these groupings, however, pretend to be representative of the community as a whole, and none of them are primarily integrative in their function.

## RITUAL UNITY OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

*Mosque.* The complex status hierarchy of individuals in the village only emerges clearly, and the effective integration of the community is only achieved, through the truly communal village activities. These will tend to be of a more formal and ritual type, and are more or less closely related to religion. In the villages in which a mosque is found, the most obvious occasion is the Friday sermon. However, the position of the mullah varies considerably, as indicated above, and many village mullahs find it difficult to make the occasion truly communal, to induce their villagers to attend sermons at the mosque — often men come home from the fields very tired, and would rather sit at home. Where a mullah of high prestige is found, he will manage to collect a considerable fraction of the village around him on such occasions, and by religious teaching raise the standard of the population, as measured on the scale of learning and piety. This in turn reflects on the village as a whole, the pressure to attend Friday sermons increases, and a unity and

[illegible] practised as a communal rite in case of need, and gives the company dervish an opportunity to reinforce his special position and demonstrate his control of power.

The actual rite is in rough outline quite simple. After an all-night session of prayer and purification on the part of the dervish, he is taken to a pool in the near-by, dwindling stream, and submerged in the water.

It is difficult to say just what degree of emotional intensity is involved in the rite so far as a majority of the participants is concerned. In the special case in question, they did not seem particularly impressed — the dervish involved was one who was frequently the object of mild horseplay, and the actual act of ducking him might have some appeal to the less serious minded. However this may be, the gravity of drought should not be underestimated, and would hardly be conducive to horseplay. The winter rain seemed to have stopped much too early, and the rite was a response to this serious situation. Considering this, the performance was probably more emotionally charged than some of the superficial comments might suggest, and certainly served to emphasize the unity and solidarity of the group. — It might incidentally be noted that this specific rite also was successful, in that fairly heavy rain followed shortly.

[illegible] Thus, this ritual of rainmaking is concerned with a very critical communal problem, and enables the dervish to assume a momentary position of dominant importance in his community. An interesting deviation from the usual norm was also observed in this case: the young son of the village Agha was submerged alongside with the dervish[1]). This equivalence may be significant in several respects. From the point of view of the dervish, it indicates the considerable extent of his momentary prestige — from a normal status of laborer he is elevated to temporary equivalence with the heir apparent of the village Agha. It may also illustrate something in the Kurdish conception of power: there is no really clear distinction made between the

1) The fact that the son rather than the Agha himself was chosen is less understandable, since of the slightly undesirable situation, and the rather malignified appearance of the actor following immersion.

sacred powers of the dervish and the practical powers of the political leader; both are equally potent in the ritual situation, and their character may be severed best by the concept of personal charisma.

## THE FEAST

The feast occupies a very prominent place in the communal life of the village, and is regarded as an active agent in producing solidarity and unity, as well as being a symbol of such unity. The fact of eating together in itself produces certain sacred obligations and submissive feelings of sympathy. The Bedouin ideal, that any person with whom you have eaten is inviolable for a minimum period of time, is not actually applied in Kurdish territory, but is well known and approved of as being highly ethical. Essentially similar, though less formal, obligations are implied in the Kurdish concept of sharing the bread.

Furthermore, the feast is a forum for conspicuous consumption, [339] and thus gives the host an opportunity to display his wealth, and to create and re-affirm ties of friendship by generosity. Thus the person who gives the feast can enhance his prestige in the village considerably; hospitality is an integral aspect of the Kurdish ideal of a man, conversely, a person with a reputation for miserliness suffers corresponding loss of prestige.

A feast in one form or another is thus a fairly frequent occurrence in the village. Since it will involve at least a major part and usually the whole of the village, it provides one of the major occasions in which leadership and moderate rivalry is expressed, and in which the relative prestige and economic and social status positions become crystallized. Essentially, these feasts are of two major types, (1) connected with religious festivals, or (2) marking transitions of status in the life cycle of members of the society.

*Religious festivals.* In some villages, the whole of the holy month of Ramadan is celebrated by regular communal evening feasts at the mosque or in the village square. In this arrangement, either each household may in turn serve as host for the whole village, or each family brings its own food. Only the men partake in the meal, for them, it becomes a social occasion of major importance. The feast

in the village as a whole[1]). Any conspicuous excesses in celebration are however tempered by given ideals of moderation.

To summarize: the *feast*, in its various religious and personal applications, offers a forum for competition and rivalry between persons, especially in the field of wealth, but this aspect is somewhat tempered by ideals of moderation and control inherent in the other scales by which individuals are evaluated. Furthermore, these communal or semi-communal occasions formalize the relative prestige positions of individuals, as seen by other individuals, and by the group as a whole. These prestige hierarchies find expression especially in situations where a regular order of serving or acting is observed. When all the ox comes out of the host's one cauldron, individuals must commonly be served in a sequence. In Kurdish culture, as in most other cultures, the *first* position in a sequence, and in fact precedence in general, is regarded as symbolic of status. These occasions thus commonly come to express a status hierarchy, and that in a familiar context where the symbolism is clear and rivalry for relative place conscious. In seating, in serving, and in any sequence of appearance, this rule is followed. In the fluid type of hierarchy found in the Kurdish villages, where status positions are not crystallized in a formal structure, but are constantly being re-evaluated in terms, in the final instance, of the common denominator of *power*, it is essential that some mechanism is found whereby relative status and power can be compared and made public by non-violent means. Characteristically, practically all the major communal occasions in the villages of Southern Kurdistan involve several instances where this hierarchy can become expressed.

## RAIDING AND WARFARE

The final and most spectacular occasion for the emergence of leadership and the expression of a status hierarchy is offered by the

[1] The usual daughter of animals has a general significance as a sign of respect — when an important visitor arrives, the throat of a sheep is cut just before the visitor approaches, so that the blood may flow across the road just as he passes over.

leadership in war parties, and ruthless conquest, was a major path of status mobility.

Raiding parties, not aimed at conquest, but merely at the looting of caravans or hamlets, tended to be more open in composition. Companies ofHamam-adventurers from various villages would congregate under the command of some charismatic leader in the terminology of the external administration, and follow him as long as his luck lasted. Characteristically enough, the Hamawands form an exception to this usual pattern. Adapting their whole society to an economy based on war and looting, they also developed a singular form of professional ethics connected with these activities. Not only were even the incidental raiding parties apparently organized in the same pattern as village administration; rules of fair play were also developed. According to the accounts of their opponents as well as their own lore, women were never harmed or even searched in the raids on caravans — if you were able to slip your money-bag to a woman without the Hamawands noticing it, your money was safe — if the woman was looted! Moreover, if the hour for prayer found them in the middle of battle, they would each in turn get off their horse and go through the complete circuit, after which they would again charge into the turmoil!

The ordinary brigand, apart from this Hamawand development, qualified himself in the eyes of the villagers by a high rating on the scale of honor and bravery, as well as a fairly consistent run of good luch. In spite of persistent efforts on the part of the external administration, brigandage and raiding continues — though on a greatly reduced scale — and this must primarily be due to the positive value given to this type of bravery. The ideal which the brigand should approach is closely similar to our conception of Robin Hood. At the time of my visit, a certain bandit and murderer by the name Kulla Fitz was active in the area. For all practical purposes he seemed to regard himself as involved in a blood feud with the police — and the stories circulating about him had a familiar Robin Hood ring. They involved stealing from the rich and giving to the poor, miraculous feats such as visiting the police inspector's home and forcing him to serve up a luxurious dinner, being gallant to the ladies, etc. etc.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

A person exhibiting similar virtues to a lesser degree will naturally tend to lead the local «rooftop society» of his own village, and is the type of person who frequently makes his career as the retainer of a feudal lord, thereby attaining elusive but probably considerable powers. 701 554 •

An occasional legitimate expression for this type of leadership today is the «posse», organized on a village level e. g. when cattle is stolen, on a larger scale when cooperating with the police in tracking a brigand. It should be noted, incidentally, that such assistance on the part of a whole district or tribe is only extended to the police when the outlaw has made himself obnoxious to the villagers of the area in question. 628

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 NA11 Kurd NA11

## Chapter VI

### Integration of part-statuses

621 Such then is the «scene» on which most social activities take place,
• 359 and where control and organization emerge. This organization however, as has repeatedly been pointed out, is one of supra- and subordination of individuals, and not a formal hierarchy of offices, divorced from the persons filling them. The actual position of the individual thus derives from all of his part-statuses, from his prestige, as derived from his rating on the suggested scales, and from his ability to exploit the possibilities offered by these factors and by chance occasions.

The integration of all these analytically separable factors into a final position in the local group hierarchy poses a problem, and in this problem the familiar anthropological techniques and concepts can offer little help. In a traditional system, where individuals are permitted to make political demands on their followers, not by virtue of being vested with an abstract office, but as *individuals* by virtue of their higher status, there must be a single, unitary hierarchy of individuals. In Kurdish society, status is derived from a number of separate and in part mutually exclusive hierarchies and contexts; these elements of status, or part-statuses, must needs be added up somehow — some common denominator must exist by which the elements are given relative values. This common denominator is locally spoken of, and it has seemed analytically convenient to regard it as a wide concept of *power*. But it is fruitless to attempt to con-

7: Barth 8-5 (1951) 1955 WBII Kurd WBII

struct a formula for the addition of these part-statuses. Their relative weights are revealed only in very few contexts of real life, since such a tremendous number of variables combine in the relations between any two individuals. 621 539

At least in certain situations, some qualifications to leadership take precedence over others, and impediments in one field can be overcome or outweighed by advantages in other fields. With respect to the part-status positions, some of these seem to be mutually incompatible, in that they can not easily be occupied by the same individual; others are mutually exclusive to the extent of non-existing in the same local community. Finally, there are conflicts of loyalties: which units of reference take precedence over others in a situation of choice.

The culture of the Kurdish villager is not an integrated culture, in the sense that there are no discrepancies and conflicts between norms. Various rules and values may in certain situations come into clear opposition. Though for some such conflicts, standardized solutions or circumlocutions have been developed, this is most clearly not true of all. Such unresolved problems are the fields where change and adaptation take place. But by virtue of the lack of consistent logic and a minimum of agreement, these are fields that can not readily be described, much less analysed, by the anthropologist. The following section contains a discussion, based on my own and some secondary material, of some of the more crude and obvious aspects of this situation. All I can attempt to do is demonstrate a few clearer cases of precedence and incompatibility, and suggest certain systematic distinctions between questions of (a) impediments to leadership, (b) general incompatibility of part-statuses, and (c) precedence of loyalties to alternative groups and identifications.

## *IMPEDIMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS TO LEADERSHIP*

The order of importance of the various qualifications to high positions are most clearly revealed in the emergence of formally recognized leadership. In certain situations, impediments to leadership may be overcome by the possession of other qualifications that take precedence. Since autonomous Kurdish institutions are only partially 622

functioning in these fields, the data is incomplete; moreover, the relative importance of various qualifications seem to differ somewhat between the infra-village and supra-village levels, and between the tribal and feudal organizations.

*The impediment of female sex.* The chosen case, illustrating the type of problem I am concerned with, relates to the position of the woman who, except for her sex, fulfills all the requirements of a leader. I have previously stated that the woman plays an active part in political life in the widest sense. On the village level, that seems to be invariably true. But on the supra-village level, there are some exceptions. The problem, in the Kurdish system, amounts to what should take precedence, the impediment of female sex, or the qualifications of high family status, wealth, etc. In the village, the differences in family status and wealth are not great enough to counterbalance an obverse difference in sex; among the leading families of Southern Kurdistan, these differences in status and wealth as compared to the general population become great enough to override the impediment of female sex, and in several cases women have emerged as leaders of considerable consequence.

The most spectacular case was that of *Adela Khanum*, leader of the *Jaf* confederacy around the time of the First World War. She belonged to the ruling lineage of Ardalan princes in the southern provinces of Persian Kurdistan, and married Osman Pasha, the leader of the seliferany section of the *Jaf*. To him, she was of assistance in administration etc., and upon his death she retained or assumed the position as leader of the *Jaf Brigade*. Soane (*op. cit.*) after his visit with her before Osman Pasha's death, speaks very highly of her, both as a person and as a ruler. In 1919, she is described as «. . . about 40 years of age, but, thanks to the skillful, though liberal, use of artificial aids, she did not look a day over 40». (Lees, 1928, p. 217). In the conflicts following the war, she pursued an independent policy of cooperation with the British and opposition to Shaikh Mahmud.

A contemporary example is *Hafsakhan*, cousin and sister-in-law of Shaikh Mahmud. As a young girl, in the critical period of Shaikh Mahmud's rebellion, she assumed the responsibility for a handful of imprisoned British officers, in order to protect them from Kurdish

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 Mill Hurd Mill

irregular. The just resentment extended to these prisoners was later the official British grounds for concerning Shaikh Mahmud's death sentence to life-long exile (later compound further).

Habibahan has since retained a prominent position in Sulaimani, and today receives visitors of both sexes in her own garden, independent of her husband, Shaikh Kader. A small, dark-haired, attractive woman, she shows a social grace and intelligence that fully justifies her reputation.

Women who are active in the political field remain the exception, however, even among the most prominent families. It would seem that in addition to exceptional ability as well as interest — and the latter is probably fairly rare too — somewhat unusual circumstances are required to give a woman the opportunity to enter publicly into political life. Adela Khanum did so as the trusted representative and later widow of Osman Pasha, and surely gained popularity in Ottoman times from her Persian origin; Habibahan showed wise moderation in a situation for which there was no clear precedence. But the mere fact that such women are found at all in Modern Kurdistan indicates the very great prestige attached to their other qualifications, primarily the fact of membership in the prominent families to which they belong.

*The impediment of low birth.* A second impediment to leadership is that of low birth, or, in the tribal system, descent from a non-lineage member. This, just as female sex, does not seem ever to be an absolute impediment that can not be out-weighed by qualifications in other fields. Status in Kurdish society is certainly in part ascribed, and descent from prominent persons is a contributory qualification to leadership, but does not seem in any political context to be an absolute requirement.

Before external administration altered the formerly fluid feudal hierarchies of Southern Kurdistan, there were constant changes in personnel and organization of territories. Political power was roughly related to land ownership — obviously, since land was passed on in family lines, political hierarchies may be spoken of in terms of dynasties. But there were only practical, no fundamental, difficulties preventing a laborer's son from working his way up

through a feudal hierarchy, and eventually be rewarded with a feudal fief, or alternatively to become a leader of a war party large enough to conquer a domain. Both these paths of upward mobility were in fact in common use, and the problem facing the ambitious youth was simply that of how best to become qualified, in terms of wealth and prestige, to assume leadership. This wealth and prestige could be achieved through luck in small raids, bravery and adventure, ability to handle people, wide extension of ties of friendship, and the impediment of low birth could thus be out-weighed.

There is, however, an aristocratic undertone to much Kurdish political thinking, and especially members of the highest leading families of the area are ascribed charisma by virtue of their descent, on the same pattern as are the descendants of the Prophet. Thus, what is passed on in the families of high status is more than mere wealth; and the fact of low birth, quite apart from its disadvantage in terms of initial poverty, would create considerable difficulty if the person were pretending for the very highest status positions. This aspect is clearly expressed in several traditional accounts from Baban times, where the brave hero of modest birth in the critical moment, when he could have achieved the highest position, deserves his gloom and is later rewarded by the Baban Pasha. (E. g. a story of Salim Beg, who was offered the position as ruler of Southern Kurdistan by the Persian Nadir Shah). But the Baban family itself is said to be descended from Pakha Hamma Dezhnawa, who owned no more than one small village in Pushdir.

In the tribal system, there enters the additional factor that descent from the apical ancestor of the lineage is a theoretical prerequisite for membership in the group, and thus for political power in it. Even this basic principle of organization can be circumvented, however, if a person appears who by high status or de-facto power can control the group.

An obvious example is the Jaf confederacy, where the *Begzade* do not claim common descent with all the tribes in the confederacy, but none the less occupy a position of unquestioned authority. Other examples are found in the recent history of the Hamawands, who for a while followed the *Jaf Begzade*, later the Berzinja Shaikhs or

the time of Sheikh Said and Sheikh Mahmud. Thus, while no one who is not a member of the lineage can achieve a position within the segmentary lineage system, the lineage group as a whole, or even a section of it, temporarily broken away from the remainder of the descent group, can join a larger confederacy under a charismatic leader.

In summary, one might say that there are no absolute impediments, or, normally, necessary requirements, relating to leadership in any of the Southern Kurdish political systems; that persons theoretically may qualify for leadership by any combination of part-statuses, so long as they add up to a total status position sufficiently exhibited to correspond to, or identify, the political and other demands involved in leading the group in question.

### INCOMPATIBILITY OF PART-STATUSES

Clearly, only ascribed status positions, based on sex and birth, could function as true impediments to leadership. Various achieved status positions may be incompatible with high political positions, but since such status positions can be changed, they are at most temporary impediments, and can hardly be discussed under the present heading.

Most of these incompatibilities have been suggested above. Of the part-statuses in the religious field, the *mullah* will tend to be rather separated from the general village community — he is frequently a tenant farmer, but rarely occupies any other part-status position, with the occasional exception of *Mullā*. Membership in a dervish brotherhood is clearly a badge of low class, and the dervish will not occupy any of the higher status positions. Conversely, the title of *Mullā* is a badge of high status, and is combined with any of the higher part-status positions, including that of the *mullah*. A woman can not be a *mullah*.

The hierarchy of class, as implied in the discussion, seems to divide the local community into separable categories that do not significantly overlap in terms of prestige or general position in the village and supra-village hierarchy.

[illegible] In summary, the following diagram (No. 9) suggests the relative [illegible] positions of various social categories in the village hierarchy, and [illegible] their approximate spread on an ordinate of class-height — obviously a very impressionistic diagram, for illustrative purposes only. Different part-statuses that do not overlap in their spread on the low-high

Diagram No. 9. Relative status of some social categories.

axis are incompatible; furthermore, the mullah often not being fully integrated in the community, there will be a lower frequency of combination of the status of mullah with the other, theoretically compatible, part-statuses.

## PRECEDENCE IN LOYALTIES

87/ In some conflict situations, any specific individual may be faced with a choice as to which group or person he should support — primarily the alternatives of lineage group vs. land, lineage group

of the unquenchable savagery of both brothers, and their desperate efforts to resist. The account follows the development from Osman Bey dismissing his brother from abdicating in his favour, through his efforts later to resist Turkish pressures, when he shut a kind of determination and fierceness, like a man who has set his back against the walls (p. 113) till finally open conflict resulted between the brothers, and Osman Bey was reduced to a pawn in the hands of the Ottoman Pasha of Baghdad. Rich describes his last conversation with Mahmoud Pasha: al told him .... that nevertheless I prayed God for the prosperity and strength of his family and country. He said neither could ever be strong, while so many powerful members of the family existed. I insisted that it might be. 'Yes' said he, 'if God sent a plague among us and only left one alive's (p. 123).

*Loyalty to leader.* In spite of what has been said, loyalties may remain with a leader after his defeat, when the actual organization of which he is the head is greatly reduced in power, and he himself, as was frequently the case, in exile across the border. This relates to the distinction made between the *ideals* and *de-facto* hierarchy (p. 98 ff). For example in Bohtan times, one Pasha might be dethroned in favour of an other through the intervention of Ottoman or Persian armies. In such cases, the old leader would often retain his high prestige and status in the ideal hierarchy, though he controlled little de-facto power at the moment; once the external force were removed, he would then be able to regain ascendancy.

In a wider application, this means that the relative power by which competing leaders are evaluated, and which forms the basis for transfer of loyalties, is to considerable extent what I have called the person's *ability to rally supporters*, i. e. his individual status in the *ideal* hierarchy, not the de-facto power he controls qua *office-holder*. The apparent contradiction between the above pattern of transfer of loyalties, and the at times heroic loyalty to a leader in the face of great adversity, resound in Kurdish tales and chronicles, thus disappears. Such examples of stubborn loyalties indicate situations of wide discrepancy between the *ideals* and the *de-facto* power hierarchies.

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## Chapter VII.

### The distributive process.

In the same way as certain part-statuses are incompatible with others in combination in a single person, certain of these statuses are incompatible in a single village community. Where two part-status positions imply conflicting interests in the same field of activity, the part-status that controls most de-facto power will dominate the scene, and sooner or later replace the other or re-define its field of relevance. A unified discussion of these aspects of incompatibility should contribute to our understanding of social change in the South Kurdish countryside.

The mechanics of such redefinitions and replacements of part-status categories should be clear from the previous discussion. From the supra-village level, a new factor is introduced, modifying the power or prestige connected with a certain part-status position — e. g. the introduction of a civil code that robs the muallak of much of his power, a serious defeat reduces the prestige of a previously dominant tira, or land registration settles property disputes in the favour of certain persons. The individual occupying a relative position in the total hierarchy of super- and sub-ordination may then find one of two things to have happened: (a) his power, and thus his de-facto position in the hierarchy, has been modified, in which case a fluid adjustment and transfer of loyalties will tend to follow in the village community, or (b) his de-facto power, in itself unchanged, is in turn modified by changes in the relative prestige attached to his

Y: Kurds 8-5 (1951) 1953 Hall Kurd Hall

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pure-status — his ability to rally persons is improved or impaired, with direct results on his position in the power hierarchy. Either or both of these reactions may result — i. e. primary changes in either or both the de-facto (a) and the ideals (b) hierarchy may be produced. In consequence the change produced by the same factor in these two hierarchies may be in contradiction, and the final adjustment is then dependent on the degree of external interference.

The patterns of these reactions and changes are set by the precedence of loyalties in conflict situations, crudely sketched above. It should then be theoretically possible to correlate the nature and form of social change in Southern Kurdistan with the factors. The assumption is generally, and I think legitimately, made that all non-tribal groups of Kurds are ultimately to be derived from one or more tribal groups. At present, as may now, the direction of change between the two poles, from *tribal* to *non-tribal* or *feudal*, is very evident, and some of the factors resulting in such a destabilization process clearly follow from the above discussion. There is further considerable indication that only the two poles themselves, described as *tribal* and *feudal*, are moderately stable, and that change from the one to the other, once initiated, is a moderately rapid process. This is e. g. indicated by the numerical preponderance of villages of the polar types as compared to intermediary types. It also follows logically from the concept of incompatibility of certain pure-statuses in a single village: many of the tribal and non-tribal formal categories or pure-statuses overlap in their fields of relevance, and this results in competition, and elimination or re-definition, where they are combined in one local community. Once the process of re-crystalling is under way, the complete set of non-tribal categories will then tend to replace its tribal counterparts.

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Probably the most potent agency of social change, with a very direct relation to the power hierarchy in the village, are changes in the pattern of land tenure. Ottoman land codes and taxation policy, corrupt administration, and the increasing emphasis in Kurdish culture on leisure and real property have all encouraged the concentration of land in few hands, and the establishment of feudal patterns of delegation of indirect rights on land. The resulting class hierarchy

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[illegible] and I would draw the readers attention to the exceedingly many minor interdependences of kinship, political and economic factors in the [illegible] village studied.

Miscellaneous notes on Turkish names

The ordinary Kurd has a single name given to him on [illegible] which the following are typical - Ahmad, Ali, Hussein, Kamil [illegible], Rahim, Shamin. If it is necessary to be more specific he will give the names of his village also; thus we find that agricultural [illegible] chiefs often use the name of their village as a surname - eg Sheikh Ahmad Shaikh Hamad, - Hamad being the village of origin. Among the Turkish each village is [illegible]

The title Agha will be discussed in detail later - it is normally translated "chief" and is carried by the landlords of villages whose landlords were religious. As a title it follows the name - thus Ali Agha, Hamid Beis Agha. To be more specific the name of the village is added - thus Hamid Beis Agha i Bangarden.

Analogous to this is the title Beg. Normally speaking it is a Turkish title but is used by some Kurds. Thus the Kurdish people of Bangarden call themselves Begzadeh, by virtue of the fact that their leaders claim descent from the former princes of Bangarden, who established an independent principality in the 17th/18th Century. The use of Beg among the Kurds seems to be identical to Agha elsewhere, and to avoid confusion I refer to the chief of Bangarden, his Kurdish name, his Agha and not Bimen or Beg as he is normally called.

Bey [persian] is similarly a Turkish title which is carried by certain families. The Agha of Bart for instance is Bey Saidi Agha and the title appears correct since to the ancestry of the chiefs of Bartalla.

The title Sheikh does not, as in Arabia, imply tribal leadership. Normally it is reserved for religious leaders - e.g. Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, a leader of the Nakshbandi sect of dervishes. The name is however sometimes carried on an ordinary name. Thus Sheikh Mahmud Agha of Rawandiz is not himself a religious leader. He was given the patronymic name Sheikh Mahmud on birth after a relative who had been a real sheikh.

The Mulla is the village priest, his precise functions are discussed later. As a title it comes before the name - thus Mulla Mahmud.

Hajji is the Moslemian title for those who have visited Mecca. As the Arabs welcome this, the bearer of such a title likes to be

"See C.J. Edmonds - A Bibliography of Southern Kurdish (Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol.XXIV, 49?).

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administrative economy stopped the Turkish expedient of paying the tribal Aghas an annual subsidy provided they kept their tribe in order. This procedure substantially gave the tribal Aghs an hereditary administrative authority, and has had serious repercussions which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The salary awarded to Sheikh Mahmoud of Saluk was stopped some years ago and, as might be expected, his influence on tribal leaders declined rapidly. As is evidenced by the civil claims of the Aghas of Saqez and their tribal clients, the Saluk has currently only a little of the former time, though Sheikh Mahmoud with a wide sweep of his arm, will declare that all the land belongs to him and that the tribes of Saqez and Bana are only there as tribesmen. At the present moment (1950) his prestige is probably at the opposite stage to the assembly have appointed a "Centre of Settlement" and regularly attends the legislative assemblies in Tehran. The appointment carries with it a small salary, but its real importance so far as the tribes are concerned is that it demonstrates that the Saluk is in harmony with the Government and with the Tehran authorities.

## Kinship Structure

While I have been shocked out the superficial political structure of the community the real nature of the relationship between the various Aghas and their followers can only be understood in terms of kinship.

The essentially contractual nature of the Aghas' authority was only vaguely understood by the earlier British administrators. Sir Harrison remarks (p. 67) "The Aghas are very oppressive to their tenants, more especially where the Government is close at hand and can assert its authority. In the mountain districts the tribesmen are accordingly poor, they have little to fear from the Government, and their chief finds it difficult to coerce them. A strong chief would probably soon oppear of be did". This statement brings out the fact, already well known from examples in the African field, that Government support for "the Chief" frequently gives that individual a tyrannical authority quite foreign to the ordinary tribal system of government, but it does not explain the Aghas normal relationship to his followers.

## Marriage of Commoners

As we have seen already the tribe is essentially a patrilineal clan. It is moreover largely endogamous by virtue of the system of arbitrarily marriage common to most Mohammedan societies. Reference to the tables of Kinship Terminology at the end of this book

Notes on Analysis relating the Further Study

The foregoing analysis has three aspects to the fact that the Ashe is of the same kinship group as the majority of his followers and very closely related to many of them. It was interesting to note that to accommodate the Hadji class of Dongola differentiation between "Khan Sahibeen" (my relatives) and "Nawaab" (powerful), but I doubt whether there is any precise dividing line between the two classifications. I would like to include in the former term at least some of the second cousins. The practical distinction seemed to be that the Khans were allowed to sit in the guest house by right while the Nawaab could only do so by special invitation. Linguistically there appeared to be a confusion between the terms Nawaab and Sardaar both of which were translated to me as arabic Sultaan [Sheikh]. In this area however there is considerable overlapping between the two English distinctions of Kinship and Rank and the confusion is probably only due to my linguistic incompetence.

Another point that requires further examination is the precise significance of the title Ashe. We have seen that from the point of view of political organization each good Ashe of any tribe can, and only can, Ashe, in the sense of Leadership. The succession however does not necessarily follow the rule of primogeniture. As it happens both Sheikh Mohammed Ashe of Nalkab and all Ashe of Dagmit have living with them in the same village brothers who are older than themselves. In the former case the elder brother leads a retired life and takes no part in village affairs; in the latter Abdullah Ashe who lives in all Ashe's house in Dagmit throughout the winter seems off into the generation to the summer with the sheep and goats and a few of the followers and establishes his own home [settlement of Umsh there]. But though Abdullah is the elder brother there is never any suggestion that anyone but all Ashe is head of the group. In the other hand though the Ashe of Dagmit is quite definitely all Ashe the title is much more widely distributed as a form of address. Thus in Dagmit the old chief All, the brother, his two nephew's Sharia and All and presumably his wife's son also [who was away during my visit] are all given the title Ashe in ordinary speech. And this seems to be the normal usage. Thus Sheikh Ashe's brother in Kangarlua is known as Sheikh Ashe though he does not function as a landlord, and Sheikh Mohamed Ashe's four eldest sons all carry the title. What is not clear is how the title is inherited on the lineage agnatic, for instance will the sons of Sharia, who will in their time presumably be second cousins of the reigning Ashe of Dagmit also carry the title? Probably there is no definite rule.

In the remainder of this book where I refer to the Ashe or the Ashes of a particular group I shall imply only those individuals who FULFIL the sociological function of the Ashe, and not any sons or near relatives who happen to bear the same title. The sociological function of the good Ashe can be quite clearly defined. He is the

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### The Guest House

623. So far we have been mainly concerned with describing the relative social positions of the different individuals that go to make up the Kachin village community. It is now necessary to consider these same relationships on an institutional plane and to examine more specifically the economic context in which they operate.

I have defined the position of the village lord in functional terms as (a) the individual who "owns" the land and who receives rent by virtue of that title and (b) the individual responsible for the upkeep of the Guest House. We must now examine this definition more carefully.

624 It is a marked feature of Kachin custom that the strength, 622A. character and position, in addition to free land and lodging 622B. at the expense of the kin. The more lavish the kin's hospitality • 624 the greater the esteem of his fellows; so much so that the prestige a man gains by virtue of being a good and generous host may in terms of reputation fully discount disadvantages of birth. Gumsi were kins of Sinpaw for example though only a poor man and a fairly distant cousin of the ruling chief of his clan has a tremendous reputation throughout the district simply on account of his hospitality. In all cases it was maintained that he was such more of a man (jinsa - the Kachin idiom is the same as our own) than his wealthier cousins Kachin esteemed kins of kinsh. If Gumsi were not as generous, in the argot, he also would be rich and powerful; "Kachin Ndawngdi was wisely not an old woman. It must be admitted that a more capitalistic concept in the form of economic advantage or potential influence. But the pattern of the society is such that this form of reputation is extended above all others, and it is in the light of this sort of values that the institution of the Guest House must be considered.

344 The the Kachin country the Guest House is either actually a 624 house. Higher travellers are few and can be accommodated if 394A necessary somewhere in the kin's own residence; during the season on the other hand a chief requires to erected somewhere close to the kin's house and fitted out with carpets, mats and cushions. It is here that the traveller is expected to take his meals and sleep.

* This incidentally seems to have been Gumsi Ndawngdi's reputation throughout his life: see Map p. 253.

† In the plains villages however the great bulk of the common and the greatest frequency of visitor travellers necessitates a permanent building for the Guest House. For description see Map 47 - 49.

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[illegible] 783 [illegible] 421.

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[illegible]

[illegible] the above before stepping onto the stage. Once the Bells overlap [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

000 wheat sports, a summer house from the heat of the plains, and other things on which people spend their annual savings.

439 277 Tobacco is the only important export of Kurdistan. It has not been scientifically cultivated to such an extent that it can compete with sources outside Iraq. The government experimental farm near Sulaimaniya is, however, carrying out valuable research work in the improvement of Kurdish agriculture, especially the production of tobacco. At present Kurdish tobacco is bought, from the villagers who grow it, by 'dings' of merchants in the towns, and sent to factories in Baghdad to be made up into cigarettes. Owing to the low price at which they are offered Iraqi cigarettes find a ready sale throughout Iraq. But unfortunately little of the profits reach the grower.

295 Another potential source of revenue in Kurdistan is the fruit-growing industry, which so far has been quite neglected except for local consumption. When one leaves the lowlands and the motor roads, and rides on horseback along the narrow mountain tracks which the lowlander never sees, with hillsides covered with grape-vines green the eye, and in the valleys the water of gushing springs flows under the shade of leafy mulberry and walnut trees. Apples, pears, pomegranates, figs and other fruits are abundant with no scientific cultivation, and much of them is wasted.

[278] Were Mohammedan prejudice overcome, and up-to-date machinery for producing wine installed in Sulaimaniya, an industry might be started which would one day rival that of France or the Rhine. I have sometimes spoken with rich Kurdish aghas in their highland villages, whose wealth was only evident in their voluminous waistbands and large guest-houses with numbers of armed retainers waiting to do their bidding. When asked why they do not develop their resources, a lack of imagination becomes apparent—"Our fathers grew tobacco, and we are manag-

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